Category: Analysis

  • The Politics of Local Defence Forces in Magway

    The Politics of Local Defence Forces in Magway

    The Politics of Local Defence Forces in Magway

    Defence Minister Bo Let Yar, Magway Federal Unit (Photo: supplied)
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    Briefing Papers on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma | Part 6

    This analysis is the sixth part of a series of briefing papers on the federal unit politics of Central Burma. Part 1 examined the structural formation of federal units, Part 2 analysed their internal power structures, and Part 3 focused on the human rights frameworks embedded in the interim constitutional arrangements of three federal units in Ah Nyar. Part 4 analysed the Magway’s Defence Force Law and security scenarios and Part 5 presented the Local Administrative Mechanisms within the resistance movement in Central Burma.

    KEY TAKEAWAYS

    1. Magway’s resistance directly threatens the regime’s war machine. The region hosts 15 of Burma’s 25 Defence Industries factories, three military-use air bases and 32 ground units. Resistance forces control much of the countryside and key oil fields, prompting the regime’s heaviest air campaign in the country (at least 322 airstrikes in five months) and large-scale ground offensives in Pakokku and Gangaw districts.
    2. LDFs form an important pillar of the resistance, but they remain fragmented. Our records identify 93 active LDFs in Magway, 80% of them in Pakokku District. More than half (50 out of 93) operate under independent commands and a further 12 sit in two separate coalitions. LDFs cooperate in operation-based alliances but keep control over their own fighters, weapons and revenue.
    3. Magway Federal Unit has approached LDFs carefully and strategically since its interim political arrangement initiated, but its command remains geographically narrow. It brought LDFs into its political leadership and cabinet through the Chin, Yaw and Taung Thar and armed resistance blocs. Magway’s Defence Force Law offers LDFs flexible pathways into the unit’s security system. As a result, 31 of the 93 LDFs are now under the unit’s command led by Bo Let Yar. However, 30 of these 31 are in Pakokku District and the unit’s military reach barely extends to the south-western uplands or the Yaw area.
    4. LDFs in the Yaw and Asho Chin communities are gradually becoming ethnic identity-based armed organisations. Asho Chin Defence Force has become the Asho National Army, with its own political wing. Yaw Defence Force and Yaw Army plan to merge into a single Yaw force and three former NUG battalions have formed Yaw Liberation Army, which is likely to join them. These groups are consolidating around Yaw and Asho Chin identity rather than moving into the unit’s chain of command.
    5. Arakan Army is the decisive external actor in Magway’s western and northern zones. Five of the eight post-coup groups under AA control are active in Magway or on its border. AA engages LDFs bilaterally, through routes that bypass both the federal unit and the NUG–KIO command and it has not publicly welcomed the Magway Federal Unit Government. Whether AA accepts the consolidation of LDFs under the unit will shape whether Magway moves towards a single chain of command or a fragmented, bloc-based security landscape.

    Myanmar Military in Magway

    Magway is a central base of the Myanmar military (locally known as Tatmadaw). Fifteen of Burma’s 25 Defence Industries (DI or KaPaSa) factories are in Magway Region, which makes Magway the military’s main weapons-producing base. These factories produce mortars, multiple-launch rockets, aerial bombs, anti-aircraft guns, fuzes and small arms. Most sit on the western bank of the Ayeyarwady in Minhla, Sinbaungwe, Ngape and Sidoktaya, or in the uplands of Seikphyu, Pauk and Saw. Many of these areas are now contested. In addition, since the coup the military junta has used three active air bases in the region to run operations across the country’s western corner.

    Figure 1. DI and military-use air bases in Magway (Sources: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, Myanmar Defence and Security Institute and Myanmar Now)

    Alongside this industrial base, Magway hosts a sizeable ground force. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies has identified 32 military units in the region. They include two Light Infantry Division headquarters (LID 88 in Magway and LID 101 in Pakokku) and two operations commands (AOC 905 and AROC-73). There are also 22 infantry and light infantry battalions, five artillery and tank battalions, and a basic military training depot (BMTD-7) in Taungdwingyi. Most units are positioned along the Ayeyarwady corridor. Magway District has the most (10), followed by Minbu and Pakokku (8 each), and Thayet and Gangaw (3 each). The largest concentrations are around Magway town, where LID 88 is based alongside two light infantry battalions and a tank battalion, and Pakokku, where LID 101 shares a base with four infantry battalions. Smaller clusters of three battalions each sit in Yesagyo and Salin. None of these units had been captured by resistance forces as of the time of this reporting.

    Figure 2. Ground military units in Magway (Sources: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies and COAR)

    The Resistance Movement in Magway

    Magway emerged as a new resistance stronghold after the military coup in 2021. Before the coup, the region was one of the military’s most secure areas, and it hosts most of the Defence Industries, airbases and several infantry battalions across five districts. The resistance that grew after February 2021 has therefore been a direct threat to the regime’s supply base, not a peripheral insurgency.

    Armed resistance took hold within two months along with widespread resistance across Central Burma. The coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing then admitted that “To be honest… well, if I’m being honest, I didn’t expect it to be on this scale” (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2024). In the Yaw area of Gangaw, Htilin and Saw, local defence forces merged into the Yaw Defence Force in 2021. By November that year, after about 80% of government employees there had resigned, local politicians and resistance fighters had formed their own People’s Administration Team (Myanmar Now, 2021). Nearly six years on, Magway’s resistance controls much of the countryside and the line between the two is fought over every month.

    Fighting has increasingly centred on the regime’s industrial base and oil fields across Pakokku, Gangaw and Minbu districts. From late April 2026, LID 101 moved troops along the roads linking Pakokku, Pauk, Myaing and Yesagyo, and in June it launched a counteroffensive to either retake or destroy the resistance-held Kyaukkwet oil field in Myaing. LID 99 also involved in this large-scale operation (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026a). Between 23 June and 8 August 2026, a column of about 1,000 troops from the two divisions raided at least 31 villages in Myaing and Pauk while artillery and aircraft struck others. At least 38 civilians were killed, at least 15 were injured, and at least 370 homes were burned, displacing thousands of people (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026b). Air power has been central to the campaign. Between 31 March and 31 August 2026, Magway recorded at least 322 airstrikes, more than any other state or region and over 20% of the 1,583 recorded nationwide (ISP-Myanmar, 2026).

    The human cost has been heavy. In July 2026, the UN reported that more than 100,000 people had recently been displaced across Myaing, Pakokku, Pauk and Saw townships, including more than 80,000 in Pakokku since mid-May (UN OCHA, 2026).

    Territorial Control

    Resistance controls majority of the rural villages, especially in three strategic areas below.

    • Pakokku uplands (Myaing, Pauk, Yesagyo and Seikphyu),
    • Yaw area (Gangaw, Htilin and Saw) and
    • South-western uplands (Ngape, Minbu, Salin, Sidoktaya, Mindon and Thayet).

    Pakokku uplands (Myaing, Pauk, Yesagyo and Seikphyu townships) are resistance stronghold and areas shaping Magway resistance landscape including emerging rebel governance structures within Magway Federal Unit arrangement. Resistance forces have held the Kyaukkwet oil field in Myaing since March 2024 and the larger Letpanto field in Pauk. The area’s oil revenue explains why the regime made it the main target of its 2026 counteroffensive. LID 101, backed by LID 99, moved troops along the main roads from Pakokku to Pauk, Myaing and Yesagyo to regain oil-producing areas and cut off resistance revenue (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026a).

    Yaw area organised early and largely on its own terms. Local defence forces in Saw and Kyaukhtu merged into the Yaw Defence Force in 2021 (Burma News International, 2021). By November that year, after about 80% of government employees had resigned, local politicians and resistance fighters had formed their own People’s Administration Team (Myanmar Now, 2021). The area borders Chin State, and the road between Saw and Kanpetlet is a supply corridor for Magway, Chin and Arakan forces. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies’ records indicate that the junta’s late-2026 offensive aims not only to cut off this route but also to establish a firm foothold along it. The junta wants to turn it into a key staging area from which it can send sufficient forces from Magway to Kanpetlet. A large military convoy reached the Laung She defence factory in Saw in September 2026, and clashes were reported in Htilin Township in early November (DVB, 2026).

    In the south-western uplands, local forces fight alongside the Arakan Army (AA) along the Ann–Padan road. The regime still holds the main towns, especially along the Irrawaddy River.

    Local Defence Forces

    Local Defence Forces (LDF) are a critical feature of the resistance landscape in central Burma. In Magway, they exist alongside the NUG resistance infrastructure: the People’s Defence Teams (PDT or PaKaPha), which are organised by township and village, and the district-based People’s Defence Force (PDF) battalions under the NUG Ministry of Defence. LDFs emerged from the same 2021 uprising, but they grew from the village up. Most were formed by local youth, community leaders and former protest organisers to defend their own areas, and they still recruit, fund and fight mainly where they began. For this analysis, a LDF is an armed resistance group that sits outside the NUG’s Ministry of Defence chain of command, meaning that it is neither a PDF battalion nor a Pa Ka Pha unit. Beyond this core criterion, LDFs typically share three further characteristics, although not every group displays all of them. First, they are formed by and recruit mainly from, a bounded constituency, whether territorial (a village, village tract or township), ethnic or tribal, social (such as students) or ideological (such as communist or social democratic). Second, they operate mainly within a defined area, usually where they were formed. Third, they were active during the period covered by our records. These characteristics are therefore used as indicators rather than strict requirements and borderline cases are classified on the balance of available evidence. Later affiliation with the Magway Federal Unit Government or a coalition does not change a group’s classification. The definition excludes armed organisations typically based outside Magway that operate in the region, such as the Arakan Army or Chin Brotherhood members, as well as regime-aligned militias.

    Two types of LDF are broadly classified within Magway Federal Unit Defence Force Law: Territory-based and Ethnic or tribal-based forces (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026c).

    Territory-based LDFs are rooted in a village tract or township and are defined by geography rather than identity. They make up most of the groups in our records and are concentrated in the Pakokku uplands (Myaing, Pauk, Yesagyo and Seikphyu). Examples named in public reporting include the Earthquake PDF, Myaing Solidarity Alliance and Southern Yesagyo PDF. Ethnic or tribal-based LDFs organise around a shared community identity and defend that community’s areas. The clearest examples are the Yaw Defence Force in Gangaw, Htilin and Saw and the Chin Defence Force-Asho (CDF-Asho) and Asho Chin Defence Force (ACDF), which represents Asho Chin communities in Minbu and Thayet districts and along the Arakan Yoma. For the purposes of this analysis, “ethnic or tribal group” is defined according to Section 12(d) of the Interim Political Arrangement Law of the Magway Federal Unit. Section 12(d)(4) expressly recognises the Yaw and the Taung Thar as ethnic groups (Interim Political Arrangement Law of the Magway Federal Unit, 2025). 

    Our records identify 93 active LDF groups in Magway, and 74 of them (80%) are in Pakokku District. The remainder are spread across Minbu (8), Gangaw (5), Magway (4) and Thayet (2). The size of these LDFs vary from a handful of troops to some hundreds.

    Figure 3. Active LDF groups by district (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    Chain of Command

    LDFs are structurally outside the NUG’s command, but they cooperate with NUG forces in the wider resistance across the region. This cooperation is usually project-based: groups join specific operations rather than a standing command, contributing fighters, weapons and local knowledge for a defined objective and then returning to their own areas. The Ah Nyar Tamar Operation is one example. In this way, LDFs give the resistance depth and local legitimacy that the NUG’s formal structures cannot provide alone, while keeping control over their own fighters, weapons and revenue. 

    More than half (50 out of 93) operate under independent or separate commands. Another 31 are under the Magway Federal Unit Government, while 7 belong to the Ah Nyar Myay Coalition and 5 to the People’s Liberation Coalition. Every structured command is concentrated in Pakokku District, which accounts for 30 of the 31 groups linked to the Federal Unit Government and all 12 coalition members (Ah Nyar Myay Coalition and People’s Liberation Coalition). Outside Pakokku, command integration is almost absent. Of the 19 LDFs in Minbu, Magway, Thayet and Gangaw districts, 18 operate independently, and only one, in Minbu, is linked to the Federal Unit Government. The Federal Unit Government’s military reach therefore rests largely on the Pakokku district rather than on a region-wide base, even though it claims authority over all of Magway.

    Even within Pakokku, command is plural rather than unified. Of the district’s 74 groups, 32 remain independent and 12 sit within two coalitions that are distinct from the Federal Unit Government. The district with the densest resistance network is thus also the one with the most competing centres of command. This reflects the local origins of these groups: most were formed to defend particular villages or communities, and they retain control over their own fighters, weapons and resources. For many, joining a wider structure is a conditional choice rather than a given. They weigh access to arms, funding and legitimacy against the loss of autonomy. Independent status does not mean isolation. As noted above, LDFs routinely cooperate with NUG forces and with one another in operation-based alliances.

    Figure 4. Identified Military Commands of LDF Groups in Magway (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    The Politics of Ethnic Minority in Gangaw and Minbu Districts

    Magway is commonly described as part of the Bamar heartland. According to the 2014 census, the region had 3.9 million people across five districts and 26 townships and sub-townships, 85% of them rural (Department of Population, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2015). Gangaw District (Gangaw, Htilin and Saw townships and Kyaukhtu sub-township), the core of the Yaw area, had 250,858 people in 2014, or 6.4% of the region’s population, and 89% of them were rural. The Taung Thar live mainly in villages in Htilin and Saw townships, with a few in Gangaw. The four south-western townships most associated with Asho Chin communities (Ngape, Saytottara, Mindon and Kamma) had a further 234,220 people, about 6% of the regional total. Not every resident of these areas belongs to a minority. However, they are remote, mostly rural, upland areas on the borders of Chin and Arakan states, and they have long been peripheral to the regional government in Magway town.

    Since the coup, these communities have turned their distinct identities into distinct armed and political organisations. In the Yaw area, local defence forces merged into the Yaw Defence Force in 2021. Yaw forces have since moved closer to the Arakan Army (AA) and the Chin Brotherhood, and several PDF-Gangaw battalions left the NUG’s command to join the Yaw Army. In the south-west, the Chin Defence Force-Asho has fought alongside the AA along the Ann–Padan road since October 2025. Its Commander-in-Chief was killed in a regime ambush in Ngape Township in August 2026 (DVB, 2026a).

    The Magway Federal Unit has begun to respond. Section 12(d)(4) of its Interim Political Arrangement Law expressly recognises the Yaw and the Taung Thar as ethnic groups. This acknowledgement goes beyond the state’s official classification, which treats the Yaw only as a sub-group of the Bamar and does not list the Taung Thar at all. The unit has also created a Ministry of Ethnic Affairs, headed by Salai Aung Win from Asho Chin representative bloc of Magway Federal Unit Government.

    LDFs with Ethnic Identifications in Gangaw and Minbu Districts

    Yaw Defence Force (YDF)

    Founded

    12 May 2021

    Base area

    Gangaw District

    Key ties

    PDFs, Arakan Army; planned merger with the Yaw Army, Spring Revolution Alliance

    YDF is a local armed resistance group founded on 12 May 2021, three months after the military coup. It is based in the Yaw area of Gangaw District, mainly Saw Township and Kyaukhtu Sub-township and was founded and led by local youth. Its stated aims are to resist regime forces and protect local communities and it has fought alongside PDFs and other resistance groups. In August 2022, its Patriot Mobile Rangers unit formed an alliance with the Daung Luth Linn LPDF. YDF has also built ties with ethnic armed organisations. When its deputy commander-in-chief, Phyo Wai Soe, a founding leader, was killed in a regime airstrike on 8 October 2022, the Arakan Army issued a condolence statement crediting him with building relations between the two groups. In 2023, YDF publicly endorsed the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army’s goals of federalism and self-determination. YDF is active in Gangaw district. Recently both YDF and YA released a joint statement on the plan for forming a single Yaw Armed Force.

    Yaw Army (YA)

    Founded

    2 January 2024 (origins in the YRPA, March 2021)

    Base area

    Mainly Saw Township

    Key ties

    Arakan Army, KIO, Spring Revolution Alliance, Chin Brotherhood

    Originated from the Yaw Regional People’s Defence Alliance (YRPA), a coalition of local defence groups formed in March 2021. YA was established on 2 January 2024 to build a stronger military and political organisation for the Yaw region. Its political aim is, at a minimum, a self-administered Yaw region, which it defines as six townships: Gangaw, Saw, Kyaw, Laungshe, Kyaukhtu and Htilin. Its external ties lie mainly with ethnic armed organisations. It credits the Arakan Army and the Kachin Independence Organisation with training and support, and it is a member of the Spring Revolution Alliance. It is close to the Chin Brotherhood. YA is mostly active in Saw township. Recently both YA and YDF released a joint statement on the plan for forming a single Yaw Armed Force.

    Yaw Liberation Army (YLA)

    Founded

    1 August 2026 (announced 5 September 2026)

    Base area

    Gangaw District; southern Chin State and Kyaukhtu area

    Origins

    Former NUG Gangaw District Battalions 1, 18 and 19

    YLA was formally established on 1 August 2026 and announced its founding on 5 September 2026. It grew out of Battalion No. 18 of the NUG Ministry of Defence’s Gangaw District Command. Its Facebook page, created in December 2022 as “Yaw National Revolution Force – Htilin”, was renamed the Yaw National Revolution Force in January 2026 and the YLA in August. The founding statement says its members come from Battalions 1, 18 and 19, which served under the NUG Ministry of Defence for five years. YLA says its aim is to decide Yaw affairs for itself, gain greater military freedom and build wider alliances. It insists that its separation reflects neither distrust of the NUG nor personal disputes and it pledges to keep fighting alongside NUG battalions in southern Chin State and the Kyaukhtu area.

    Asho National Army (ANA)

    Founded

    16 November 2021 as ACDF; renamed 12 October 2026

    Base area

    Ngape and Sidoktaya townships

    Key ties

    PRA-Magway, Myay Latt Bamar Defence Force, Galon People’s Defence Force, Arakan Army

    The army was founded on 16 November 2021 as the Asho Chin Defence Force (ACDF) and changed to its current name on 12 October 2026. It is now the armed wing of the Asho National Organisation (ANO). The new name was adopted at a congress held from 20 to 24 September 2026, and the group says it does not change its founding aims. These aims are to build an “Asho Land” with guaranteed self-determination, to establish a democratic federal union and to lead Asho national politics. The group claims to represent all Asho Chin areas. It has conducted joint operations with PRA-Magway, the Minbu District No. 2 Battalion, the New Society Army and the People Independence Army. It allied with PRA-Magway in November 2021 and with the Myay Latt Bamar Defence Force and Galon People’s Defence Force in August 2023. Notably, it has no alliance or recorded cooperation with CDF-Asho.

    ANA is active in Ngape and Sidoktaya townships.

    Chin Defence Force – Asho (CDF – Asho)

    Founded

    January 2023, Ngape and Padan area

    Base area

    Ngape and Sidoktaya townships

    Key ties

    Arakan Army, PRA-Magway

    CDF-Asho was formed on 21 January 2023 in the Ngape and Padan area. It is an Asho Chin force based mainly in Ngape and Sidoktaya townships. According to its position statement, its founders were Asho Chin youth together with soldiers, police, teachers, students and health workers who had joined the Civil Disobedience Movement, many of whom had received basic military training from ethnic armed organisations, local PDFs and NUG Ministry of Defence units. It presents as a protector not only of the Asho Chin but of all Chin peoples and oppressed communities. It commits the group to ending military dictatorship and securing freedom, justice, equality and self-determination for the Chin within a federal democratic union. It also pledges to work with the NUG Ministry of Defence, the Chin National Front and other Chin revolutionary groups and to follow the NUG’s military code of conduct. In practice, its closest ties are with the Arakan Army, for which it acts as an ally on the eastern front and with PRA-Magway and other local forces along the Ann–Padan road.

    Its Commander-in-Chief, Salai Yoe Chin, was killed in a regime ambush in Ngape Township on 14 August 2026.

    Magway Federal Unit Government and LDFs

    Formed as a coalition of seven representative blocs, it recognises the NUG as the union government and the central authority of the revolution, reserves foreign affairs to the NUG, and sets out power-sharing in Chapter 17 of the interim arrangement (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026a). Seven representative blocs are 

    1. Elected MPs of 2020 General Elections
    2. Political Parties3 Chin Ethnic Group
    3. Yaw and Taung Thar Ethnic Group
    4. Unions, Women, Youth and Strike Group
    5. CDM Civic Servants
    6. Armed Resistance Groups

    Since its sub-national political process began in late 2023, Magway has approached LDFs carefully and strategically, incorporating them through three of these blocs. The Chin, Yaw and Taung Thar and armed resistance group blocs have served as the main channels through which LDFs entered the emerging federal unit leadership. LDFs with ethnic identifications in Gangaw and Minbu districts took part both in drafting Magway’s interim arrangement and in forming the interim federal unit government. This representation is reflected in the cabinet. U Aung Ko Latt, Minister of Planning, Finance, Natural Resources and Energy, was appointed from the Yaw and Taung Thar bloc. Salai Aung Win, Minister of Ethnic Affairs, was appointed from the Chin bloc. Bo Let Yar, Minister of Defence, represents the armed resistance group bloc.

    Bo Let Yar is a resistance fighter who led the People’s Defence Team (Pa Ka Pha) in Myaing Township before becoming Minister of Defence of the Magway Federal Unit. Under his leadership, 21 LDFs in Magway welcomed the formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government and committed to joining its Ministry of Defence in order to establish a single chain of command for LDFs (Earthquake People’s Defence Force, 2026). Bo Let Yar has since coordinated and incorporated 31 LDFs into the federal unit’s command.

    The enactment of the Magway Defence Force Law could further consolidate this arrangement. The law creates two main command structures:

    • the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force; and
    • the Joint Military Operation Commission (JMOC).

    This arrangement gives LDFs flexible pathways. They can either join the Defence Force and be incorporated into its military columns under Bo Let Yar’s command, or work through the JMOC, which is chaired by Dr Ye Htun Zaw, the current Chief Minister of Magway (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026d). The JMOC route could allow LDFs to retain control of their forces and their organisational identity while cooperating, on their own terms, with the wider resistance, including the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force and the Arakan Army. 

    A closer look at where the 31 LDFs under Bo Let Yar’s command operate shows a highly uneven geography. Thirty of them are concentrated in Pakokku District and the unit’s command barely reaches the two other contested zones in Magway: the south-western uplands (Ngape, Minbu, Salin, Sidoktaya, Mindon and Thayet) and the Yaw area (Gangaw, Htilin and Saw). Only one group outside Pakokku, the Daung Sit Aung Local PDF in Minbu District, is currently under Bo Let Yar’s command, while several others in these zones remain outside the unit’s command structure.

    This gap should be read alongside three recent developments within the Asho Chin and Yaw communities, which make up much of the armed landscape in these two zones. First, CDF-Asho lost its founding commander, Salai Yoe Chin, who was killed in a regime ambush in Ngape Township on 14 August 2026 (DVB, 2026a). As both a military leader and an influential figure within the Asho Chin community, his death could significantly affect the group’s internal cohesion and the social networks that link it to Magway’s wider security system. Second, the Asho Chin Defence Force (ACDF) repositioned itself as an ethnic armed organisation, renaming itself the Asho National Organisation/Asho National Army (ANO/ANA) on 12 October 2026 (Asho National Organisation/Asho National Army, 2026). The new name drops both “Chin” and “Defence”, a term that became the hallmark of the resistance forces formed after the 2021 coup. With a separate political and armed wing, the group now resembles the established ethnic armed organisations in Burma rather than a local defence force.

    Third, in the Yaw area, YDF and YA recently issued a joint statement announcing plans to merge the two regional forces (Yaw Defence Force, 2026). Given the Yaw ethno-political agenda shared by both groups, this merger could lead to an arrangement similar to the one emerging in the Asho Chin community: a single, identity-based Yaw armed organisation rather than a set of local defence forces. Meanwhile, three Gangaw District battalions formerly under the NUG Ministry of Defence formed the Yaw Liberation Army (YLA) on 1 August 2026, outside both the NUG’s and the unit’s command (Yaw Liberation Army, 2026). It is likely that the YLA will eventually join the merged YDF–YA structure, which would consolidate most of the Yaw area’s armed actors into one organisation outside the NUG or unit’s chain of command.

    Arakan Army’s Interests and Magway’s LDFs

    Arakan Army’s (AA) engagement with Magway’s LDFs follows from a set of immediate and long-term interests that are rooted first in territory. Pakokku and Gangaw districts form a territorial route that connects the AA’s areas in Arakan and Chin State with Sagaing and Mandalay and, beyond it, with northern Shan State, where its Brotherhood Alliance partners operate. Minbu and Thayet districts provide a second connecting route across the Arakan Yoma along the Ann–Padan road. The AA’s interest in this route became visible when it and allied forces captured the Nat Yae Kan air defence base on the road in October 2025 (BNI, 2025), and later held villages inside Ngape Township (DVB, 2025). The regime’s late-2026 offensive on the Saw–Kanpetlet corridor, aimed explicitly at cutting supply routes between central Burma and areas held by Chin and Arakan forces (DVB, 2026b), shows that these routes now matter to both sides.

    These routes serve two of the AA’s interests. The immediate interest is manpower. The AA’s town-capture operations in Arakan require a steady supply of fighters and allied channels in Magway offer a way to meet part of that need. Magway-based forces have already fought beyond their home areas; YA, for example, reports fighters killed in Arakan and Chin State (Yaw Army, 2026). The longer-term interest is logistics. Maintaining military and political allies along the supply pipeline that runs from central Burma into Arakan secures both short- and long-term access and Magway’s oil economy already feeds this pipeline (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026b).

    LDFs are the most practical partners for pursuing these interests. A military alliance with LDFs does not require the AA to negotiate with the broader political agendas of the Magway Federal Unit, the NUG or the KIO/KIA. LDFs can be engaged quickly and are more likely to act on the AA’s direction. In return, the AA may have to guarantee weapons, food and shelter, and possibly to shield its partners from military or political action by the NUG or the unit. An ISP-Myanmar study lists eight post-coup groups operating under the AA’s military command, five of which are active in Magway or on its border: PRA-Magway, the ACDF (now the Asho National Army), CDF-Asho, the Student Armed Force and the PIO/PIA (DMG, 2025). PRA-Magway reported receiving AA weapons as early as 2022 (DVB, 2022), and CDF-Asho has fought alongside the AA on the Ann–Padan corridor since October 2025 (DVB, 2026a).

    Command structures sharpen this logic. The NUG’s district-based PDF battalions in Magway fall under Regional Command 1 of the NUG, which operates under the chain of command of the KIO/KIA (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026d). This makes it difficult for the AA to draw on these battalions directly. LDFs and People’s Defence Teams (Pa Ka Pha), by contrast, sit outside Regional Command 1, which makes them the forces with which the AA can engage strategically on its own terms.

    The emergence of ethnic-based armed organisations along the Magway–Arakan–Chin border and across the wider region, adds a political dimension to these interests. The ACDF’s transformation into the Asho National Army and the planned merger of the YDF and the YA point towards identity-based organisations with their own political wings. Several of these organisations already have ties to the AA (Arakan Army, 2022; Yaw Army, 2026). If this trend continues, the AA will enter the future political and military landscape of central Burma with an established set of allies.

    The AA’s public stance towards the federal unit reinforces this reading. Neither the AA nor any of the established ethnic armed organisations issued a letter welcoming the formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government, nor did they publicly state a position on it (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026a). This silence contrasts sharply with the AA’s open recognition of individual LDFs, such as its public praise for PRA-Magway’s leadership (DMG, 2023) and its condolences on the death of a founding YDF commander (Arakan Army, 2022). The evidence suggests that the AA prefers bilateral relationships with LDFs to formal engagement with the unit’s emerging authority.

    The most important question is therefore whether the AA would welcome the consolidation of Magway’s LDFs under the Magway Federal Unit. An organised, single command for LDFs could shift the balance of the AA’s short- and long-term interests. On one hand, it would give the AA one counterpart and the Defence Force Law already allows the unit’s Joint Military Operation Commission to conduct joint operations with neighbouring ethnic armed organisations (Centre for Ah Nyar Studies, 2026d). On the other hand, it would limit the direct, bilateral relationships with LDFs on which the AA’s access to Magway currently rests. How the AA weighs these considerations is likely to influence whether LDFs in Minbu, Thayet and Gangaw move towards the unit’s chain of command or remain outside it.

    Conclusion

    Magway’s revolution poses a direct threat to the junta’s war machine. Fifteen of the DI’s 25 factories sit in the region and that is why the regime has fought so hard to retake its oil fields and supply routes. Local defence forces carry much of this resistance. Our records identify 93 active LDFs, most of them in Pakokku District. Their local roots let them hold large parts of the countryside, but those same roots make them hard to command from outside. More than half of the groups (50 of 93) remain under independent or separate commands. Only 31 operate under the Magway Federal Unit.

    The Federal Unit has approached LDFs carefully and strategically. It has offered them flexible routes into its command instead of demanding immediate integration. This has brought a third of the groups under its structure without open confrontation. It has also left the harder questions unresolved: command, revenue sharing and discipline. The Myaing dispute showed how quickly unresolved control over resources can turn allies into rivals.

    LDFs with ethnic identifications in Gangaw and Minbu districts add a further layer. Yaw and Asho Chin forces have organised around their own identities and look more to the Arakan, Kachin and Chin allies than to the Federal Unit or the NUG. The Arakan Army’s interests sharpen these dynamics. Its advance into Ngape and its ties to LDFs along the western and northern edges give some groups a patron outside Magway’s own structures. Neither the AA nor established ethnic armed organisations publicly welcomed the Federal Unit’s formation. Their public silence may conceal quiet channels of communication behind the scenes, but it shows that the Federal Unit has yet to win open recognition from its most powerful neighbours.

    Whether the Federal Unit can turn this fragmented landscape into a common security order will depend less on how many groups it absorbs than on whether it can set rules that independent LDFs, minority communities and allied armed actors accept.

    References

    Arakan Army. (2022, October 11). YDF ၏ ဒုတိယစစ်ဦးစီးချုပ် ဖြိုးဝေစိုး ကျဆုံးခြင်းအတွက် ပေးပို့သော ဝမ်းနည်းကြောင်းသဝဏ်လွှာ [Message of condolence on the death of YDF Deputy Commander-in-Chief Phyo Wai Soe] [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19wWdw5k5q/ 

    Asho National Organisation/Asho National Army. (2026, October 12). အဖွဲ့အစည်းအမည် ပြောင်းလဲသတ်မှတ်ခြင်းနှင့် အမှတ်တံဆိပ်ဟောင်းများ ပယ်ဖျက်ခြင်းဆိုင်ရာ အသိပေးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာခြင်း (စာအမှတ်။ အဖခ/ဗဟရ/တထ-၄/၂၀၂၆/၀၀၁) [Public announcement on the change of organisation name and the revocation of former insignia] [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1CdCkGVFPB/ 

    BNI. (2025, October 16). AA seizes strategically vital Natyaekan Base. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/aa-seizes-strategically-vital-natyaekan-base

    Burma News International. (2021, September 29). Youths form the yaw regional defence force (YDF). Mizzima. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/youths-form-yaw-regional-defence-force-ydf

    Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2024, December 25). အညာတော်လှန်ရေး၂၀၂၅ [Ah Nyar Revolution 2025]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/ahnyarrevolution2025/

    Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026a, February 15). Ah nyar’s big questions in 2026: Where are we headed? – Centre for ah nyar studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/ah-nyars-big-questions-in-2026-where-are-we-headed/

    Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026b, May 15). Petro-contestation and emerging governance orders in Magway. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/petro-contestation-and-emerging-governance-orders-in-magway/

    Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026c, August 14). At least 38 civilians killed, 15 injured and 370 homes burned: Evidence of ground and aerial attacks by LIDs 101 and 99 in myaing and pauk. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/at-least-38-civilians-killed-15-injured-and-370-homes-burned-evidence-of-ground-and-aerial-attacks-by-lids-101-and-99-in-myaing-and-pauk/

    Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026d, October 9). Magway’s defence force law and the security scenarios ahead. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/magways-defence-force-law-and-the-security-scenarios-ahead/

    COAR Global. (2024, December 20). Actors and Control Tracker: Administrative and Military Control in Myanmar. COAR Global. https://www.coar-global.org/

    Department of Population, Republic of the Union of Myanmar. (2015, May). The 2014 Myanmar population and housing census: Magway Region (Census Report Volume 3–H) [Census Report].

    Development Media Group. (2023, March 29). Arakan Army lauds Magway Region-based anti-regime armed group. https://dmediag.com/news/aapram.html

    Development Media Group. (2025, July 10). AA provides military aid to at least 23 resistance groups: Report. Development Media Group. https://www.dmediag.com/news/apmat.html

    DVB. (2022, June 20). Magway defense force aided by Arakan Army plans to take entire region. https://english.dvb.no/magway-defense-force-aided-by-arakan-army-plans-to-take-entire-region/

    DVB. (2025, December 29). People’s defence force attacks military targets in magway region on election day. https://english.dvb.no/peoples-defence-force-launches-attacks-on-regime-targets-in-magway-region-as-elections-begin/

    DVB. (2026a, August 17). CDF-Asho commander-in-chief Salai Yoe Chin killed in military ambush in Magway Region. https://english.dvb.no/cdf-asho-commander-in-chief-salai-yoe-chin-killed-in-military-ambush-in-magway-region/

    DVB. (2026b, November 3). Military counteroffensive targets Magway-Chin corridor to choke off supply routes. DVB. https://english.dvb.no/military-counteroffensive-targets-magway-chin-corridor-to-choke-off-supply-routes/

    Earthquake People’s Defence Force. (2026, April 18). မကွေးတိုင်းဒေသတွင်းအခြေစိုက်(Local People’s Defense Force) တပ်ဖွဲ့များ၏သဘောထား ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် [Statement of Position by Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDFs) Based in Magway Region] [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19oRdXeUPm/

    Interim Political Arrangement Law of the Magway Federal Unit, 12(d)(4) (2025).

    ISP-Myanmar. (2026, September 24). Magway recorded the most airstrikes under new military chief. ISP-Myanmar. https://ispmyanmar.com/2026cst-01/

    Myanmar Now. (2021, November 12). After hobbling junta’s ability to govern in yaw, anti-coup forces form people’s administration team. Myanmar Now. https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/after-hobbling-juntas-ability-to-govern-in-yaw-anti-coup-forces-form-peoples-administration-team/

    United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2026). Myanmar humanitarian update no. 52. https://myanmar.un.org/sites/default/files/2026-07/OCHA%20Myanmar%20-%20Humanitarian%20Update%20No.%2052_final.pdf

    Yaw Army. (2026, January 2). ယောတပ်တော် (Yaw Army) ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ခြင်း (၂) နှစ်ပြည့်အထိမ်းအမှတ် ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် [Statement on the second anniversary of the founding of the Yaw Army] [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1PgF1VPgQV/

    Yaw Defence Force. (2026, November 5). တပ်ပေါင်းစည်းရေးထုတ်ပြန်ကြေငြာချက် [Joint statement on the merger of forces] [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1FCKoMxxii/

    Yaw Liberation Army. (2026, September 5). ယောလွတ်မြောက်ရေးတပ်တော် ဖွဲ့စည်းတည်ထောင်ကြောင်း ထုတ်ပြန်ကြေညာချက် [Statement announcing the formation of the Yaw Liberation Army] (Statement No. 1/2026) [Statement]. https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1PNbmZQkzG/

  • Naga Analysis

    Naga Analysis

    Naga Analysis

    Isak Chishi Swu (NSCN-IM), Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) and Shangwang Shangyung Khaplang (NSCN-K) [from left to right]

    Executive Summary

    Myanmar’s Naga SAZ is shaped by three intersecting pressures: fragmented armed organisations, contested political authority and cross-border security and connectivity. The Naga SAZ – Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun is part of a wider Naga homeland of India and Myanmar. Isolation, conflict and disrupted supply routes heighten human-security concerns; cross-border access matters for livelihoods and essential goods. Six Naga organisations are reported active. They are NSCN-K-YA, NSCN-K-AM, NSCN-IM, its Eastern Flank, Naga PDF and ENNO/ENDA. Their relationships with Myanmar’s military diverge. NSCN-K-AM and NSCN-IM’s Eastern Flank have reportedly cooperated in operations, while Naga PDF and ENDA have fought alongside resistance forces against the military. NSCN-K-AM is pursuing ceasefire discussions with the military regime in Myanmar and India; NSCN-K-YA remains outside India’s ceasefire framework and has engaged in reported cross-border attacks. NSCN-IM’s central leadership continues negotiations with India under the 2015 Framework Agreement. KIO/KIA’s role can generally be understood as both a military partner and a political fault line. It has supported Naga PDF and ENDA with training, supplies and joint operations. Yet NSCN-K-AM has challenged KIA involvement in the SAZ. Disputes over personnel, territory and the proposed “Naga Unit” could sharpen disagreements over Naga autonomy, representation and Naga–Kachin relations. Sagaing Federal Unit’s 2025 constitution establishes a framework for shared powers, Naga self-administration, courts and a seven-member interim government in the region. Implementation remains uncertain: we observe that the SAZ administrative and judicial authorities have not been formed. ENNO/ENDA’s separate interim political arrangement and the unclear engagement of eight NLD MPs elected in the 2020 General Elections complicate institution-building; however, they hold decisive influence over the SAZ’s status within the Unit’s constitutional framework. India’s proposed border fencing and limits on the Free Movement Regime have drawn Naga opposition. India’s security cooperation with the military regime in Myanmar and interest in strategic resources may affect armed groups’ mobility, leverage and economic prospects.

    Download the report. 

    Who Are the Nagas?

    Naga communities in Myanmar have historically inhabited the mountainous borderlands between north-western Myanmar and north-eastern India, where village-based societies maintained distinct customary institutions and cultural traditions. During British colonial rule, imperial expansion gradually brought parts of these territories under administration, while colonial classifications and frontier policies shaped how Naga communities were governed. In 1940, the Naga Hills Tract in Burma was upgraded to a district, although some Naga-inhabited areas remained outside direct administration (Kakati, 2025). Following Burma’s independence in 1948, the international boundary increasingly separated Naga communities across Myanmar and India, while cross-border connections and negotiations with state authorities continued. With the military-drafted constitution in 2008, Myanmar established the Naga Self-Administered Zone (N-SAZ). However, the zone does not encompass all Naga communities in Myanmar, whose historical experiences and political relationships extend beyond its administrative boundaries.

    The N-SAZ is located in the northwestern part of Sagaing Region, Myanmar, bordering Nagaland State in India. The Naga people have historically inhabited a wider region known as Nagaland, which extends across north-eastern India and north-western Myanmar. Although the majority of the Naga population resides in India, substantial Naga communities also live in Myanmar. Scholars identify more than 40 Naga tribes across the two countries, while the Myanmar government recognises seven major Naga tribes: Tangshang, Tankung, Makury, Para, Konyak, Khiamniungan and Lainong. According to the Naga Literature and Culture Committee, approximately 400,000 people identify as Naga (Htar et al., 2020).

    The N-SAZ covers approximately 5168.206 square miles (Oo, 2023), with a total population residing within three main townships and five sub-townships as of 2014: 116,828 (2014 Census Reports). It comprises three main townships and five sub-townships, with Lahe serving as the administrative centre.

    Main Township

    Sub-Township

    Lahe Township

    Htanparkway

    Leshi Township

    Mobaingluk

    Sonemara

    Nanyun Township

    Donhee

    Pansaung

    Table showing the list of Townships and sub-townships in N-SAZ (Source: 2014 Census Report)

    Naga communities also reside in Hkamti, Homalin and Tamu of Sagaing, as well as in parts of Kachin State. The zone is home not only to Naga communities but also to smaller populations of Shan, Kachin and Bamar people. With its isolated nature, the region faces significant public health and environmental challenges. According to the World Food Programme, it is highly vulnerable to natural disasters and disease outbreaks. In 2016, a measles outbreak reportedly killed more than 40 children across the Naga SAZ (Nang & Paddock, 2016). The N-SAZ’s geographical position along the India–Myanmar border also has important implications for regional connectivity and human security. The zone borders Homalin Township in Sagaing and areas of Kachin. Amid ongoing conflict and political instability, communities across these areas have faced significant restrictions on movement and access to essential supplies, particularly in areas affected by military checkpoints and blockades. These constraints have disrupted the movement of food and other basic necessities, increasing the vulnerability of communities in remote areas. In response, some communities in Sagaing Region have relied on supplies entering through the Naga border from India. Cross-border connectivity therefore remains an important factor shaping local livelihoods, access to essential goods and human security in the Naga region.

    Armed Organisations

    The National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) emerged on 31 January 1980, when Isak Chisi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and S. S. Khaplang established the organisation in opposition to the 1975 Shillong Accord, which sections of the Naga National Council had signed with the Indian government (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-a). The NSCN pursued Naga self-determination and sought to unite Naga-inhabited territories in India and Burma with the vision of sovereign Nagalim or People’s Republic of Nagalim (Tajwar, 2026). According to Dahiya (2015), the NSCN split in 1988 when the Isak–Muivah faction broke away from the Khaplang-led faction amid deep mutual suspicions and a massacre in which approximately 140 Tangkhul and Sema cadres were reportedly killed by insurgents loyal to Khaplang, who were predominantly Konyaks. The resulting division gave rise to NSCN-IM, led by Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, and NSCN-K, led by S. S. Khaplang. The split also reflected regional and community-based divisions within the movement. The NSCN-K subsequently established a significant presence in Myanmar’s Naga-inhabited borderlands, which became an important base for its activities and its relations with other armed organisations operating in the region (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-c).

    Map of the Proposed Extent of Nagalim (Source: adapted from the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization)

    Several Naga armed organisations are currently reported to be active in the Naga SAZ inside Myanmar, including

    1. NSCN-K-YA (Yung Aung)
    2. NSCN-K-AM (Ang Mai)
    3. NSCN-IM (Isak-Muivah)
    4. NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank)
    5. Naga People’s Defence Force (Naga PDF)
    6. Eastern Naga Defence Army (ENDA)

    In addition to Naga armed organisations, armed groups associated with Meitei and Assamese insurgent movements have reportedly maintained a presence in Myanmar’s Naga-inhabited borderlands, which have served as bases for several Indian insurgent groups (The Irrawaddy, 2024). The operational alignments of these organisations vary. NSCN-K-AM and NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank) have reportedly conducted coordinated operations alongside the Myanmar military, whereas the Naga PDF and ENDA have reportedly carried out offensive operations against it (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2021; KaPhe’ (In Burmese, ‘ကဖေး’), 2025). Since the 2021 military coup, three clashes have reportedly occurred among NSCN factions, reflecting continuing divisions and competition within the Naga armed movement (Mizzima, 2026a).

    Reported Activity Areas Map of Naga Armed Organisations (Source: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies)

    1. National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (Yung Aung) [NSCN-K-YA]

    The group is a Naga armed organisation led by Yung Aung and primarily based in Myanmar’s Naga SAZ. Its reported areas of operation include the Naga SAZ and territories along the India–Myanmar border. Sources estimate that the faction had approximately 400–500 cadres, although its current strength remains unclear (Hasnat, 2024). The organisation has continued its armed campaign for Naga self-determination and does not participate in India’s ceasefire arrangements. It has also been reported to maintain links with other armed organisations in Northeast India, including the United Liberation Front of Asom–Independent (ULFA-I) and Manipur’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (Hasnat, 2024; Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 2020).

    The faction has also reportedly been targeted in cross-border military operations. On 13 July 2025, the Indian military was accused of conducting drone strikes against armed-group camps in Nanyun and Lahe townships, Sagaing Region, targeting NSCN-K-YA and ULFA-I positions (The Irrawaddy, 2025). On 20 October 2025, another reported drone strike targeted an NSCN-K-YA base in Lahe Township. According to Myanmar Now (2025), the attack struck Karm Way Lawri village and killed two people, including the 27-year-old son of an NSCN-K leader and an eight-year-old child. These incidents have raised concerns about the effects of cross-border military operations on communities living in the Naga SAZ.

    2. National Socialist Council of Nagaland–Khaplang (Ang Mai) [NSCN-K-AM]

    In January 2019, the Myanmar military seized NSCN-K’s headquarters in Taga village, Nanyun Township, amid allegations that the group supported Assamese and Meitei armed organisations opposing the Indian government (EastMojo, 2019; The Irrawaddy, 2019). On 6 November 2019, 11 NSCN-K members, including Ang Mai, were reportedly sentenced to two years’ imprisonment under Section 17(1) of Myanmar’s Unlawful Associations Act (Southeast Asia Journal, 2019). Colonel Than Naing, spokesperson for the Myanmar military’s Northwest Regional Command (Radio Free Asia, 2019), stated that 

    “It is a violation of the terms of the preliminary peace agreement reached with the regional government. The main reason is that they have been engaged in military cooperation with Assamese and Meitei armed groups that oppose India. Since this constitutes a breach of those terms, action has been taken against them.”

    Reports stated that Myanmar authorities stated that instructed the group to dismantle its bases and continue negotiations within the framework of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Mizzima, 2019). These events preceded the formation of NSCN-K-AM in 2023. The NSCN-K-AM is a splinter faction of NSCN-K led by retired Major General Ang Mai. The group separated from the Yung Aung-led NSCN-K faction on 2 July 2023 (CNI, 2025c). It operates primarily in Myanmar’s Naga SAZ and neighbouring areas along the India –Myanmar border. Its reported strength remains uncertain, although analysts estimate that the faction had more than 100 fighters in 2024 (Hasnat, 2024).

    NSCN-K-AM has sought to strengthen its position in the Naga region while managing relations with other armed organisations and pursuing negotiations with authorities in Myanmar and India. In February 2025, the group reported that it had sent a letter to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), asking it not to enter or interfere in the Naga SAZ. According to CNI News, the faction’s peace committee chairman, U Chin Aung, stated that the group was seeking to maintain regional peace and stability while engaging in discussions with both the Myanmar military and the Indian government (CNI, 2025b).

    The faction has also pursued parallel ceasefire initiatives. On 9 February 2025, The Morung Express reported that NSCN-K (Ang Mai) had entered what it described as a bilateral ceasefire process with the Government of India. According to a statement issued by the faction’s Ministry of Information and Publicity, the initiative aimed to create conditions for dialogue and advance the resolution of the Indo-Naga-Myanmar political issue (The Morung Express, 2025). Separately, CNI News reported that NSCN-K-AM had held meetings with Myanmar military representatives during 2024 and subsequently discussed a preliminary bilateral ceasefire agreement with the Sagaing Region government. The group indicated that it intended to retain its identity as a Naga armed organisation rather than transform into a militia or Border Guard Force. As of 5 May 2025, the proposed regional ceasefire had not been formally signed (CNI, 2025a).

    Engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities continued in 2026. Myanmar’s Ministry of Information reported that the National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) met a delegation from NSCN-K-AM in Nay Pyi Taw to discuss regional stability, socioeconomic development and long-term peacebuilding in the Naga region. The meeting also addressed potential ceasefire arrangements, liaison offices, future high-level talks and coordination with government departments (Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw, 2026).

    3. National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)

    Founded after the split of the mother organisation NSCN in 1988, the NSCN-IM is one of the principal Naga armed and political organisations. Historically led by Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, the organisation pursues Naga self-determination and the establishment of Nagalim, combining Naga-inhabited territories. The group primarily operates in the NE region of India, especially in Nagaland. It also maintains a significant presence inside the Naga SAZ of Burma (Singh, 2020).

    The NSCN-IM maintains a hierarchical political and military structure under its central leadership, historically headed by Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah. Its political administration operates through the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN), comprising nine ministries: four principal ministries responsible for defence, home affairs, finance and foreign affairs, and five others covering education, information and publicity, forests and minerals, law and justice, and religious affairs. Administratively, its areas of influence are divided into 11 regions, extending governance to town and village levels. Its military wing, the Naga Army, reportedly comprises one brigade and six battalions, with an estimated 4,500 personnel, alongside specialised mobile units and local commands (South Asia Terrorism Portal, n.d.-b).

    In June 2026, the NSCN-IM Joint Council reaffirmed its collective leadership under Chairman Q. Tuccu, Vice-Chairman Tongmeth Wangnao, General Secretary and Ato Kilonser Th. Muivah, and Deputy Ato Kilonser V. S. Atem (Morung Express, 2026b). However, in July 2026, the Eastern Flank declared a provisional government under Ikato I. Chishi Swu, indicating significant internal divisions over leadership and the organisation’s political direction (NE NOW NEWS, 2026). On 3 August 2015, the Government of India and the NSCN signed the Framework Agreement to establish a basis for further negotiations towards a political settlement (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2015a). NSCN-IM’s published version refers to sharing sovereign power through negotiated competencies and an “enduring inclusive new relationship of peaceful co-existence of the two entities” (Singh, 2020). The organisation has also demanded recognition of a separate Naga national flag and constitution.

    4. National Socialist Council of Nagalim–Isak-Muivah (Eastern Flank)

    The Western and Eastern Flanks of the Naga Army were split in September 2019 with the aim of strengthening its military capacity amid pressure from the Government of India (GoI) to conclude negotiations without a separate Naga flag and constitution. The Eastern Flank later criticised the NSCN-IM’s central leadership for failing to take necessary political action during this period. According to a 2025 report, the group is operating in Yangnwe Village in Leshi Township.

    Former leader Lt. Gen. (Retd.) H.S. Ramsan has had a complex relationship with India and other armed actors in Myanmar. A local news outlet covering the NE region of India claims that Ramsan was on a “most wanted list” by Indian authorities and to have operated in Myanmar after leaving India (Mirror Desk, 2026). In 2022, his faction reportedly cooperated with the Myanmar military in operations against resistance forces in Homalin and Tamu townships (KaPhe’ (In Burmese, ‘ကဖေး’), 2025). On 13 January 2025, a letter attributed to Lt. Gen. (Retd.) H. S. Ramsan, commander of the Eastern Flank, NSCN-IM Naga Army, expressed the faction’s willingness to cooperate with National Unity Government (NUG) Prime Minister Mahn Win Khaing Than and support the struggle against Myanmar’s military junta (Naga Voice – နာဂအသံ, 2025). However, the letter’s authenticity could not be independently verified, and no official NUG response was identified in the sources reviewed.

    In April 2025, Ikato I. Chishi Swu, son of the late NSCN-IM co-founder Isak Chishi Swu, reportedly broke with the organisation’s central leadership amid growing internal tensions (Manipur Update, 2025a). The split became more explicit in July 2026, when the Eastern Flank appointed Ikato as chairman of a nine-member team tasked with forming a provisional government following a meeting, which the group named the “Extraordinary Joint Emergency Meeting” at Mt. Horeb Camp in Myanmar’s Sagaing Region (Morung Express, 2026c). The meeting was chaired by Lt Gen (Retd) Hs Ramsan. The meeting formed the “Provisional Government” in the following structure.

    Organisational structure of the Provisional Government of NSCN-IM Eastern Flank (Source: Design created based on information from Morung Express)

    The faction declared that the spirit of the 1997 ceasefire agreement with the Government of India had “ceased to exist” and criticised the central leadership for allegedly compromising the Naga political position in negotiations (Eastern Mirror News, 2026; NE NOW NEWS, 2026). Both the NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank) and the NSCN-K-YA use the name Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim (GPRN) for their administrative structures, although they use different logos to represent their respective organisations.

    Alongside these political developments, the security dynamics surrounding the Eastern Flank, particularly the reported attack on its Mt. Horeb Camp, provide important context for understanding the faction’s evolving position. On 7 October 2026, India and Myanmar held their third Defence Cooperation Meeting in Guwahati, reviewing existing defence initiatives and discussing further cooperation in training, capacity-building and mutual security (The Economic Times, 2026). Four days later, the Eastern Flank alleged that drones had dropped approximately 60 bombs on Mt. Horeb Camp, damaging parts of the site. Although the faction initially reported no casualties, subsequent reporting indicated that three cadres were injured. The perpetrators have not been independently confirmed (Ukhrul Times, 2026; Rural Post, 2026).

    5. Naga People’s Defence Force (Naga PDF) and PaKaPha

    Naga PDF was formed on 20 June 2021 by the young people of Naga in collaboration with Shan, Chin and Bamar communities in response to Myanmar’s military coup (NPDF, n.d.). It is reported to operate as the No. 1 Battalion of Naga District under the NUG Ministry of Defence. In a March 2024 interview with Kachin News Group, NPDF official Bo Lin Yone stated that the force was fighting for federalism, equality and individual rights and had maintained an alliance with the Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO/KIA) since December 2022. The group also participated alongside the KIA in fighting around Selzin. More recently, CNI Myanmar reported the opening of basic military training in the Naga region. Naga PDF operates alongside Naga People Defence Organisations (locally known as PaKaPha) of the NUG. PaKaPha are also active across townships within Naga SAZ (The Voice of Spring, 2026). Naga PDF is reportedly active in Hkamti Township in Sagaing Region and Hpakant Township in Kachin State.

    6. Eastern Naga National Organisation (ENNO)/Eastern Naga Defence Army (ENDA)

    The ENDA is the armed wing of ENNO. According to its General Secretary Eno Jimi Naga, the group was established on 4 November 2021 in response to the military coup in 2021 (Kachin News Group, 2023). ISP Myanmar Peace Desk claims that ENDA is a rebranded entity resulting from a joint initiative between former NSCN-K officials and Naga legislators from the NLD (ISP Myanmar Peace Desk, 2024). However, individuals close to ENNO reportedly stated that most of the NLD legislators subsequently ceased participating in the organisation (CNI, 2025d). The organisation’s political and military structures are commonly referred to in its public statements as the ENNO/ENDA Government (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2023b).

    The organisation was established under the leadership of R. S. Awng Sai, a former lieutenant colonel in the NSCN-K who was reportedly dismissed from that organisation. He was among the group of eleven NSCN-K officials who were imprisoned in 2019 under Section 17(1) of the Unlawful Association Act in Burma (Wai Mar Tun, 2019). Within ENDA, he is identified as a lieutenant general and serves as the force’s leader (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2024). An ENDA statement dated 30 March 2023 reportedly confirmed that the organisation held a ceremony to arm its first batch of trained recruits in 2022 (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2023a). The organisation is run by a central committee with departments operating under it. The reported officeholders include Eno Jimi Naga as General Secretary and San Waung Moses as the person responsible for media and information. The organisation has also established a central liaison office in Laiza, Kachin State, and reportedly receives weapons and ammunition support from the KIA. Its principal areas of operation include Hkamti Township and the Naga SAZ, where it has reportedly conducted operations against Myanmar’s military alongside the KIA and other resistance forces. Its current territorial reach and operational capacity, however, remain difficult to establish independently.

    Beyond its military activities, ENNO/ENDA has articulated a political programme centred on ending military dictatorship, protecting ethnic rights and establishing a federal union. In February 2025, the organisation announced that it had prepared, since December 2023, the Interim Political Arrangement of Nagaland, a proposed framework to guide interim political arrangements in the eastern Naga region (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2025). The arrangement was prepared within a month of the parliaments of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay federal units enacting laws to establish interim political arrangements in their respective territories in late November 2023. Nevertheless, the content of the proposed framework and the extent of its implementation remain unclear, as ENNO/ENDA has not yet publicly released the document.

    Border Dynamics and Naga Armed Groups

    India’s plan to fence its 1,643-kilometre border with Myanmar has raised concerns among Naga communities whose social, cultural and economic ties span the border (Choudhury, 2024; Mohta, 2025). The Indian government cites security concerns, including insurgency and drug trafficking, while restrictions on the Free Movement Regime (FMR) have prompted opposition from Naga organisations (Press Information Bureau, 2024; The New Indian Express, 2025). On 26 August 2025, eleven representatives of the United Naga Council (UNC), the Naga Women’s Union (NWU) and the All Naga Students’ Association Manipur (ANSAM) met Indian central government officials in New Delhi to discuss border fencing and the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The talks ended without agreement, as the Naga delegation called for the restoration of the FMR and a halt to border fencing (The New Indian Express, 2025; IANS, 2025). No information on the participation of Myanmar-based Naga groups was found. At the Pansaung–Nampong crossing, which connects Nanyun Township of Naga SAZ with Arunachal Pradesh of India, the border market reopened on 30 July 2026 after more than six years of closure due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup. Cross-border movement, however, remains restricted, with only 30 people per day permitted to enter India for shopping and visits (Mizzima, 2026b). Border fencing has also prompted opposition from Myanmar-based Naga organisations, which argue that it threatens Indigenous land rights and divides communities (Mizzima, 2025).

    On 26 March 2026, the NSCN-K-YA claimed responsibility for an attack on a 10th Assam Rifles construction team reportedly engaged in border-fencing work along the Namgoi–Pansaung Road near Pansaung Pass, Arunachal Pradesh. The group claimed that three personnel were killed. However, Indian security officials disputed the reported fatalities, stating that one Assam Rifles personnel was injured and that no deaths had been confirmed (Ajum, 2026; B. Singh, 2026; Nagaland Post, 2026). The GoI signed the Framework Agreement with the NSCN-IM on 3 August 2015. In contrast, on 16 September 2015, the Indian government declared the NSCN-K an unlawful organisation for five years, citing its continued attacks on Indian security personnel from bases in Myanmar (Press Information Bureau, Government of India, 2015a, 2015b). Its faction – NSCN-K (AM), however, has reportedly pursued peace negotiations with both the Myanmar military regime and the GoI (CNI, 2026b; Kalita, 2026). By contrast, no comparable public reporting confirms that the NSCN-IM (Eastern Flank), the ENNO/ENDA, or the Naga PDF has participated in these formal peace talks. With that said, it should also be noted that India maintains security and defence cooperation with Myanmar’s military regime, particularly on border security and counterinsurgency. This cooperation could affect Myanmar-based Naga armed groups’ freedom of movement and cross-border operations, depending on its implementation.

    Beyond border security, access to critical minerals is another important dimension of India’s strategic interests and its relations with armed actors along the border. India seeks to diversify its rare-earth supply chains and reduce dependence on China, which dominates global rare-earth processing. In this context, Kachin State’s rare-earth deposits could offer potential opportunities for India, particularly as the KIO/KIA exercises greater control over key mining areas, including Chipwi and Pangwa. The KIO/KIA influence over mining operations, taxation and exports could therefore have implications for future regional trade and India’s access to these resources. However, Myanmar’s rare-earth exports remain heavily oriented towards China, while alternative routes to India face logistical and security challenges (Banerjee, 2026; ISP-Myanmar, 2025). Although potential trade with India could diversify the KIO/KIA’s export markets and strengthen its financial position, no confirmed supply agreement has been established. India’s interests in border security and critical minerals thus illustrate two distinct but potentially interconnected dimensions of its engagement with Myanmar, with possible implications for armed groups’ economic resources and regional influence.

    Political Parties in Naga SAZ

    In the 2020 general election, the principal parties competing in Naga SAZ were;

    • National League for Democracy (NLD),
    • Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and
    • Naga National Party (NNP).

    The Union Betterment Party (UBP) also fielded candidates, which later dissolved itself by its founding chairman, U Shwe Man after the military coup in 2021. In the 2020 general election, each township of Naga SAZ (Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun) had one Pyithu Hluttaw (House of Representatives) constituency, for a total of three constituencies. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, each township was divided into two constituencies, for a total of six. It also includes Sagaing Region Constituency No. 12 for the Amyotha Hluttaw (House of Nationalities).

    The NLD won seven of the nine township-based constituencies examined in the Pyithu Hluttaw and Sagaing Region Hluttaw, while the USDP won two. In the Pyithu Hluttaw, the NLD won in Leshi and Nanyun, while the USDP won in Lahe. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, the NLD secured both seats in Leshi and Nanyun, as well as one seat in Lahe. The USDP won the remaining seat in Lahe Township. NLD won Sagaing Region Constituency No. 12 for the Amyotha Hluttaw. These results indicate that the NLD secured most of the seats across the township-based constituencies covered by the report, while the USDP retained representation in Lahe.

    The NNP contested constituencies across all three townships and both legislatures but did not win any of the nine township-based seats examined. Nevertheless, its candidates received notable shares of the vote. In the Pyithu Hluttaw, the NNP received between 18.55 and 22.62 per cent of the vote across the three townships. In the Sagaing Region Hluttaw, its candidates received between 14.80 and 24.63 per cent across the six constituencies. After the 2021 coup and military crackdown on political parties, the NNP re-registered and later contested the junta-orchestrated 2025 election.

    Junta-appointed Union Election Commission approved NNP registration on 30 May 2023 (Source: Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw, 2023)

    The table summarises the election results in 2020.

    Election Results in the 2020 General Elections (Source: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, National Unity Government of Myanmar, 2024)

    Naga SAZ and KIO/KIA

    The historical relationship between the KIA and Naga armed movements has been influenced by the shifting strategic interests of China, India and Myanmar. From 1966, the KIA facilitated Naga fighters’ journeys to China, where they received military training and weapons, and later provided some Naga armed groups with bases, training and arms. However, between 1990 and 1992, India’s intelligence agency reportedly supplied weapons to the KIA in exchange for its commitment to cease providing bases, weapons and training to Naga and other northeastern Indian armed groups. Following the KIA’s ceasefire with Myanmar’s military government in 1994, its support for these groups reportedly declined further (Bhaumik, 2009). More recently, the KIA has supported Naga resistance forces operating in Kachin State and Sagaing Region. The NPDF, formed in 2021, has conducted military activities in alliance with the KIA since 2022 (Kachin News Group, 2023).

    Tensions over territorial authority became more explicit in February 2025, when the NSCN-K (AM) reportedly asked the KIA not to enter or interfere in the Naga SAZ. The faction argued that it was seeking to maintain regional stability while pursuing peace negotiations. These tensions were further highlighted in July 2025, when the Naga Students’ Organisation in Lahe demanded the release of 16 NSCN-K (YA) members reportedly captured by the KIA (Manipur Update, 2025b). In February 2026, the dispute intensified after KIA leader Lieutenant-General Gun Maw referred to a proposed “Naga Unit” as part of a wider strategy involving Kachin, Chin and other areas of Sagaing Region. The NSCN-K (AM) rejected the “Naga Unit” designation, arguing that the Naga struggle remains focused on achieving independence. It also expressed concerns about ethnocentrism and stressed that the Nagas and Kachins have historically lived together as brothers (CNI, 2026a). The proposed “Naga Unit” could therefore intensify disputes over territorial control and political representation by raising questions about who has the authority to govern Naga areas in Myanmar and represent Naga political aspirations. It could also deepen tensions between the NSCN-K (AM) and the KIO/KIA over political autonomy, ethnic identity and the future of Naga–Kachin relations.

    Naga SAZ and Sagaing Federal Unit

    Under the 2025 Constitution, the Sagaing Federal Unit Government was formed in late 2025, with legislative, executive and judicial powers established as separate branches of government (Section 6). Section 7 further provides for the sharing of powers among the Federal Unit Government, the Naga SAZ Government and local governments. However, the territorial boundaries of Sagaing remain unchanged from those in place at the time of the 2020 General Election, as defined under the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar (Section 44). Accordingly, the three townships comprising the Naga SAZ – Leshi, Lahe and Nanyun – retain their existing territorial boundaries (Section 46). In addition, Section 47 constitutionalises the right of indigenous peoples in Sagaing to self-determination, including through self-administered zones, subject to two conditions: territorial contiguity and conformity with future political agreements on state-building.

    The extent of the Naga SAZ’s autonomy is further defined by its relationship with the legislative institutions of Sagaing. Under Section 59(b), the SAZ may draft bills, but these must be submitted to the Sagaing Federal Unit Parliament for consideration and passage in accordance with the Parliament’s rules and procedures. This arrangement allows the Naga SAZ to initiate legislation while retaining the Federal Unit Parliament’s authority over its formal enactment. Legislative autonomy is therefore exercised within a broader institutional framework in which powers are shared between the SAZ and the Federal Unit.

    The Constitution also establishes a framework for forming the Naga SAZ’s Interim Government, linking its composition to both political representation and the 2020 electoral mandate. The government is to comprise seven members, including a Chief Administrator and a Deputy Chief Administrator (Section 86). Section 87 identifies six categories of eligible participants in its formation:

    1. Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw representatives elected in the 2020 multi-party general election who do not cooperate with the terrorist coup regime.
    2. Representatives of political parties.
    3. Representatives of ethnic groups.
    4. Civil servants participating in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
    5. Members of the Strike Forces.
    6. Other relevant individuals.

    Although this framework provides for participation by a range of political and social actors, Section 88 assigns a decisive role in selecting the seven-member government to eligible Hluttaw representatives elected in 2020 from the Naga SAZ who do not cooperate with the military junta. The arrangement thus combines broader participation in government formation with an electoral basis for executive selection. Regarding the judiciary, the Sagaing Federal Unit Constitution recognises the Naga SAZ’s authority to establish its own courts (Section 123(b)). It also permits the application of customary legal practices, provided that they do not contradict international human rights standards (Section 135).

    To our observation, the Sagaing Federal Unit has not established administrative or judicial authorities for the Naga SAZ since its formation in late 2025. One possible explanation is that Sagaing’s political leadership is adopting a cautious and conflict-sensitive approach to the Naga SAZ, particularly in light of the KIO’s position on the proposed Naga Federal Unit and the 3K area (Kantbalu, Kathar and Kawlin). The political position of the KIO-trained ENDA is another factor that may shape this relationship. ENDA has stated that it has established its own interim political arrangement (Eastern Naga Defence Army, 2025), alongside the interim constitutional framework of Sagaing Federal Unit. This raises questions about whether ENDA intends to operate within Sagaing’s emerging political structure or pursue a separate interim arrangement.

    The role of Naga elected Members of Parliament in shaping this relationship also remains unclear. Eight representatives from the NLD were elected in the Naga SAZ in the 2020 general election and secured seats in the Union and regional parliaments. Their engagement with the emerging institutions of Sagaing Federal Unit, however, has yet to be clarified. This is politically significant because, under the interim constitutional framework, they may hold substantial influence over decisions concerning the Naga SAZ’s institutional status and the exercise of its autonomy. Their participation, or lack thereof, could therefore affect the formation of the SAZ’s administrative and judicial authorities, as well as the broader relationship between Naga SAZ and Sagaing Federal Unit.

    Political Authority, Representation and the Future

    Competing sources of authority, political representation and different ambitions for self-determination shape the Naga SAZ’s political landscape today. Currently, elected representatives, established armed and political organisations, and emerging groups derive their political mandates through different pathways. However, they do not necessarily share a common vision of governance. The Naga SAZ, also commonly referred to as the eastern flank in Naga political discourse, represents only a small part of the broader Naga vision held by many armed and political groups. India, or New Delhi, remains a critical factor in understanding the Naga issue as a whole. In that sense, the Naga SAZ is a geopolitical nexus between the two countries – India and Burma (Myanmar). There is, however, no clearly established mechanism through which these actors can reconcile their political objectives and determine the future of the Naga people or the Naga SAZ.

    With the emergence of federal units, particularly Sagaing, new questions arise. Would the Sagaing Federal Unit offer a solution, or a political pathway towards a solution, to the existing complexities within the Naga SAZ? With this in mind, it is vitally important to understand that the current arrangements within the federal units in central Burma (better known locally as Ah Nyar) are temporary; they are not yet transitional. Although the interim constitutional (or political) arrangements may be complex in their language and interpretation, the immediate objective of these emerging federal units, including Sagaing, can generally be summarised as consolidating sub-national governance and political groupings. Constitutionally, the Sagaing Federal Unit is notably cautious in its approach to ethnic minority issues, including those concerning the Naga people or the Naga SAZ. It retains the existing territorial boundaries (as of 2020, before the military coup). At the same time, Sagaing is constitutionally committed to the right to self-determination, particularly for ethnic minorities. It is important to note here that successive governments of Burma (Myanmar) have been relatively cautious and silent on this particular right within the international legal framework, given the decades-long ethnic liberation movement. When the NLD administration ratified the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it reserved its position on Article (1) of the Covenant concerning the right to self-determination. This, however, was not unique to the NLD administration. This constitutional commitment marks a politically significant departure from the historical caution of successive governments towards the right to self-determination. However, this alone is not a remedy for the protracted identity conflicts and liberation struggles within the Naga community or the Naga SAZ. Therefore, how the Sagaing Federal Unit brings actors on the ground into its political process becomes important.

    The eight NLD representatives elected from Naga SAZ constituencies in the 2020 general election retain a potentially significant electoral mandate, although their current engagement in the evolving political landscape remains unclear. The Naga PDF and township-based PaKaPha (People’s Defence Teams) operate under the authority of the NUG Ministry of Defence through Regional Command 1. Their role in supporting the five representative blocs of the Sagaing Federal Unit to establish sub-national governance in the Naga SAZ remains an open question. This process is further complicated by the ongoing transition of NUG mechanisms, including healthcare, education and administration, to the emerging federal units in Sagaing and Magway. Moreover, Regional Command 1, led by a KIA-appointed regional commander, may have limited incentives to facilitate this process, particularly if it conflicts with the KIO/KIA’s political interests in the Naga region.

    Meanwhile, ENNO/ENDA’s interim political arrangement and the distinct political objectives of Naga armed organisations indicate that political institution-building is proceeding through multiple channels. This creates a potential divergence between electoral representation, armed influence and emerging institutional authority. Without mechanisms to connect these sources of legitimacy, competing political arrangements may reinforce fragmentation rather than produce a broadly accepted framework for self-governance.

    Regional relationships further complicate this process. The KIO/KIA’s proposed “Naga Unit” has exposed disagreements over territorial authority and the political future of Naga-inhabited areas. The NNP’s move towards participation in the junta-orchestrated 2025 elections adds another dimension to the existing complexities within the Naga SAZ. The NNP did not secure any seats in the Naga SAZ constituencies in the 2020 general election. Among the four parties in the Naga SAZ, the NLD and UBP abandoned their previous political pathways by moving away from the military junta, while the NNP chose a different course by participating in the junta-orchestrated elections.

    The future political trajectory of the Naga SAZ will therefore depend on whether its diverse actors can translate their respective sources of influence into an agreed framework for representation and governance. Without such an agreement, parallel institutional initiatives and competing claims to authority may persist, limiting political coordination and weakening the legitimacy of emerging governance structures.

    Conclusion

    The Naga political landscape constitutes a complex intersection of armed competition, political fragmentation and competing approaches to self-determination. Although six Naga armed organisations are identified in this analysis, their strategic alignments and relationships with the Myanmar military, resistance forces and the KIO/KIA differ significantly. Cooperation on the battlefield does not necessarily translate into political unity, as these organisations maintain distinct interests and positions regarding territorial authority and the future political status of the Naga region or the Naga SAZ. Similar divisions characterise Naga political parties and organisations. The NNP participation in the junta-orchestrated elections in 2025, alongside ENNO/ENDA’s pursuit of an interim political arrangement, illustrates divergent approaches to political engagement, representation and institution-building.

    These intra-Naga dynamics are further complicated by regional political differences, particularly over the relationship between the Naga SAZ, Sagaing Federal Unit and the KIO/KIA. Disagreements over territorial jurisdiction, political representation and the proposed Naga Unit introduce another dimension to an already fragmented political landscape.

    Geopolitically, the Naga SAZ occupies a distinctive position between India and Myanmar. Although it remains a peripheral territory that successive governments in Myanmar have historically given limited attention, it carries broader security and political significance for New Delhi and India’s northeastern states. Despite their differences, Naga armed and political actors share a recurring aspiration for a distinct political status, sometimes expressed through the vision of a Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim, extending Naga-inhabited areas across northeastern India and Myanmar. The central question is whether this shared aspiration can bridge organisational divisions and competing regional or international interests to produce a coherent political project.

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    Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw. (2023, May 30). နာဂအမျိုးသားပါတီ [Naga National Party (NNP)] ကို နိုင်ငံရေးပါတီအဖြစ် မှတ်ပုံတင်ခွင့်ပြုခြင်း. Myanmar National Portal. https://myanmar.gov.mm/news-media/news/latest-news/-/asset_publisher/idasset354/content/%25E1%2580%2594%25E1%2580%25AC%25E1%2580%2582%25E1%2580%25A1%25E1%2580%2599%25E1%2580%25BB%25E1%2580%25AD%25E1%2580%25AF%25E1%2580%25B8%25E1%2580%259E%25E1%2580%25AC%25E1%2580%25B8%25E1%2580%2595%25E1%2580%25AB%25E1%2580%2590%25E1%2580%25AE-naga-

    Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw. (2026). NSPNC and NSCN-K (AM) meet to strengthen regional stability, development. Ministry of Information, Naypyitaw. http://moi.gov.mm/moi%3Aeng/index.php/news/21712

    Mirror Desk. (2026). Leaders of Naga armed groups in India’s ‘most wanted’ list. Eastern Mirror Nagaland. https://www.easternmirrornagaland.com/leaders-of-naga-armed-groups-in-indias-most-wanted-list

    Mizzima. (2019). Myanmar army detains NSCN-K leaders. Burma News International. https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/myanmar-army-detains-nscn-k-leaders

    Mizzima. (2025, December 8). Naga groups in Myanmar and India unite to oppose border fence. Mizzima News. https://eng.mizzima.com/2025/12/08/28924?

    Mizzima. (2026a, January 26). Three clashes in 16 days as Naga factions fight for territory and trade control in Sagaing. Mizzima News. https://eng.mizzima.com/2026/01/26/30638

    Mizzima. (2026b, August 6). Only border market reopened in Pansaung, not border gate, says ENWA. Mizzima News. https://eng.mizzima.com/2026/08/06/37132?

    Mohta, N. (2025, September 18). The India-Myanmar border: When deep cultural ties are tested and redrawn. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/research/the-india-myanmar-border-when-deep-cultural-ties-are-tested-and-redrawn-10256865/

    Morung Express. (2026a). Engaging in ceasefire process with government of India: NSCN-K (Ang Mai). Morung Express. https://morungexpress.com/engaging-in-ceasefire-process-with-government-of-india-nscn-k-ang-mai

    Morung Express. (2026b). NSCN (IM) Joint Council reaffirms framework agreement, backs collective leadership. Morung Express. https://www.morungexpress.com/nscn-im-joint-council-reaffirms-framework-agreement-backs-collective-leadership

    Morung Express. (2026c, July 23). NSCN/GPRN eastern flank: Breakaway NSCN (IM) group declares ‘provisional government’. Morung Express. https://morungexpress.com/nscngprn-eastern-flank-breakaway-nscn-im-group-declares-provisional-government

    Naga Voice – နာဂအသံ. (2025, August 3). NUG ဝန်ကြီးချုပ် ဦးမန်းဝင်းခိုင်သန်းအား NUG နှင့် ပူးပေါင်းရန် ပေးပို့သည်စာ [Photo]. Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/share/1Fn7tUT8TB/

    Nagaland Post. (2026, March 27). NSCN-K (ya) claims attack on AR in Arunachal. Nagaland Post. https://nagalandpost.com/nscn-k-ya-claims-attack-on-ar-in-arunachal/

    Nang, S., & Paddock, R. C. (2016, August 6). Myanmar measles outbreak kills 40 in remote villages. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/world/asia/myanmar-measles-outbreak-kills-40-in-remote-villages.html

    NE NOW NEWS. (2026, July 24). NSCN-IM splits, eastern flank forms provisional government under Ikato Chishi Swu. NorthEast Now. https://nenow.in/top-news/nscn-im-splits-eastern-flank-forms-provisional-government-under-ikato-chishi-swu.html

    NPDF. (n.d.). Official Page of NPDF. NPDF – Battalion. Retrieved 12 October 2026, from https://web.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100090719661213

    Nyein Nyein. (2019, February 7). NSCN-K denies violating ceasefire. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/nscn-k-denies-violating-ceasefire.html

    Oo, T. M. M. (2023, February 27). နာဂကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့်ရဒေသ ဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေး ကြိုးပမ်းဆောင်ရွက်မှုများ. MDN – Myanmar Digital News. https://mdn.gov.mm/my/naagkiuypiungaupkhupkhngrdes-phnphiuttiuttkre-kiupmcheaangrkmumaa

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    Press Information Bureau, Government of India. (2015b, September 16). Declaration of NSCN(K) as an unlawful organisation for a period of five years under the unlawful activities (prevention), act 1967. Press Information Bureau. https://www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?lang=2&reg=48&relid=126947

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  • Magway’s Defence Force Law and the Security Scenarios Ahead

    Magway’s Defence Force Law and the Security Scenarios Ahead

    Magway’s Defence Force Law and the Security Scenarios Ahead

    Resistance fighters in Ah Nyar – Tamar Operation of Magway (Photo: Magway PDF)

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (Part 4). This analysis is the fourth part of the briefing paper on federal unit politics in central Burma. Part 1 examined the structural formation of federal units, Part 2 analysed their internal power structures, and Part 3 focused on the human rights frameworks embedded in the interim constitutional arrangements of three federal units in Ah Nyar.

    Enacted on 25 September 2026 as Law No. 7 by the 12th Assembly of the Magway Federal Unit Parliament, the Magway Defence Force Law establishes a legal framework for organising and governing the resistance forces. It comprises nine chapters and 66 Articles and was enacted pursuant to Section 123 of the Interim Political Arrangement Law of the Magway Federal Unit. Section 114 of the Interim Political Arrangement Law provides for two distinct forces at the federal-unit level:

    • Magway Federal Unit Defence Force and
    • Magway Federal Unit Security Force or police force.

    The Defence Force Law gives effect to the former by setting out its structure, command arrangements and operational framework. It also establishes a Joint Military Operation Commission to facilitate cooperation with Union-level defence forces, ethnic armed organisations in neighbouring states and other resistance forces operating within Magway. The law therefore marks an important step in formalising Magway’s defence governance. It also raises questions about how the unit’s new structures will coordinate with the NUG and neighbouring forces, how local People’s Defence Teams will transition into the framework, and whether the system can balance responsive unit-level command with coherent federal security coordination.

    The origin

    Magway Federal Unit Defence Force Law grew out of a wider political shift in central Burma, better known as Ah Nyar. In Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay, regional actors have developed constitutional frameworks to establish federal unit governments in coordination with the NUG. These arrangements offer a critical political window to build new governing institutions while the country remains in conflict. Constitutionally, Magway’s Interim Political Arrangement Law laid part of the groundwork for this process. Article169 (c) authorises Magway Federal Unit to form and administer its own defence and security forces. This gives the unit a clear role in organising its security institutions. At the same time, the Interim Arrangement Law provides both the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit concurrent legislative competence over the mobilisation and deployment of federal-unit defence and security forces. The laws therefore establish a division of responsibility, but essentially, the overlap also makes coordination between the two layers critical.

    Chapter 9 of the Interim Political Arrangement Law sets out the unit’s approach to defence and security across 13 provisions, including the principle that security forces remain under civilian authority. Separately, section 119 states that “The Defence and Security Forces of the Magway Federal Unit shall be under the authority of the civilian government”. Article 63 of the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force Law reiterates this principle.

    The Law’s Main Provisions

    Magway Defence Force Law is organised into nine chapters and 66 Articles. Its central feature is a two-track security structure. Chapter 3 provides for Magway Federal Unit Defence Force, bringing smaller local defence forces together under the command of the Magway Federal Unit Defence Minister. Chapter 4 establishes a Joint Military Operation Commission (JMOC) to coordinate with ethnic or territory-based forces and conduct joint operations with Union-level defence forces, ethnic armed organisations and other resistance forces operating in Magway. These chapters create two possible routes for local forces to enter Magway’s security architecture: joining the unit’s Defence Force or operating through the Joint Military Command Commission (JMOC).

    Magway Federal Unit Defence Force

    Under Article 6, the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force is to be formed in coordination with the NUG and include resistance forces operating in Magway. Article 8 provides for the Defence Minister to invite ethnic and territory-based forces to join the force’s preparatory committee, which will establish its military code of conduct and chain of command. Article 10 (a) sets the committee’s initial term at two years. The force will be led by a Commander-in-Chief under the authority of the Defence Minister and will comprise two branches: the Active Force and the Reserve Force.

    Joint Military Operation Commission (JMOC)

    Ministry of Defence of the Unit is responsible for the JMOC’s administration and the Chief Minister heads the Commission. Its term is tied to the four-year term of the Magway Federal Unit Government. Under Article 32 (e), the JMOC is authorised to conduct joint operations with Union-level defence forces and ethnic armed organisations in neighbouring states, which means Chin and Arakan and other resistance forces operating within Magway. Article 32 (f) authorises the JMOC, in coordination with the unit’s Ministry of Defence, to issue the rules and instructions necessary to carry out its responsibilities. The JMOC will be funded by the Ministry of Defence under Article 35.

    These altogether provide a legal basis for cooperation across organisational boundaries. At the same time, the law does not by itself settle how the commission’s authority relates to NUG security coordination or to the command of the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force. Without agreed procedures for planning, approving and reviewing joint operations, the two tracks could produce overlapping or competing command structures. The law establishes two pathways for organising forces but leaves their relative authority unclear. It does not specify who decides whether a force joins the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force or operates through the JMOC, or which command takes precedence during joint operations. The relationship between existing command structures and the two tracks also remains undefined, including their respective mandates, reporting lines and oversight arrangements.

    Current Resistance Landscape and Four Pathways

    Magway’s resistance movement is not yet a single, unified force. It comprises People’s Defence Forces (PDFs), People’s Defence Teams (PDTs), People’s Security Teams (PSTs), Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDFs), military columns and other territory-based formations, as well as forces linked to ethnic armed organisations in neighbouring areas. PDFs, PDTs and PSTs operate under NUG command. LPDFs maintain separate command structures, but often coordinate with other forces in their areas of operation. PSTs operate alongside the NUG’s People’s Administrative Teams on the ground and primarily perform policing functions rather than engage in frontline combat. PDFs remain the NUG’s regular fighting force in Magway, operating under Regional Command 1 – a joint military command between the NUG and the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) covering central Burma. This leaves two other categories of forces to consider in the Magway Federal Unit’s new security arrangements: LPDFs and PDTs.

    Now they are central to the evolving landscape. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies’ internal records list 93 LPDFs and 25 PDTs as formed in all 25 townships of Magway. These figures indicate that the groups have been established or documented, but do not confirm that every unit is currently active in military operations on the ground. Our monthly security monitoring indicates that this presence is uneven across Magway’s five districts. Resistance forces have a comparatively stronger presence and greater control in parts of Pakokku and Gangaw districts. In the other three districts, the security situation appears more fluid, with intermittent armed clashes and ambushes rather than the same level of sustained resistance control.

    Magway’s Chief Minister has said the unit government will negotiate with the NUG Ministry of Defence on transitioning 25 PDTs to the federal-unit government. PDTs have a comparatively widespread presence, operating as people’s militias from village to township level. Many are also reported to be well trained in military command and formal combat. Under the new law, they may join the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force or operate through the JMOC. The two routes offer different ways to organise forces: one within the unit’s own defence structure, and the other through a mechanism for joint operations with Union-level forces, ethnic armed organisations and other resistance groups. Or PDTs themselves may choose to remain under the NUG command.

    On 93 LPDFs, our internal records indicate that Magway’s Defence Minister, Bo Let Yar, has brought together at least 31 LPDFs and reorganised them into 13 military columns under the unit’s command. These are relatively small groups operating across all five districts. Many are reported to have close ties to Bo Let Yar. Some LPDFs in the Yaw region, including the Yaw Army and Yaw Defence Force, have described themselves as emerging ethnic armed organisations. Two groups associated with the Asho Chin community – the Asho Chin People’s Defence Force and the People’s Defence Force–Asho have claimed self-administration. The ethnic-associated groups mentioned here are reported to have close ties with the Arakan Army (AA). It remains unclear which pathway these groups will choose under the new security framework. Ethnic-associated LPDFs, as well as territory-based groups such as the People’s Revolutionary Alliance (Magway) and the United States of Burma Army (USBA), could join the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force, operate through the Joint Military Operations Commission, or remain unchanged.

    SRA as a fourth pathway

    Initially a 19-member bloc, the Spring Revolution Alliance is a coalition of armed groups created in November 2025. It operates through three regional commands, one of which extends into Magway. Magway-based groups such as the Yaw Army, Yaw Defence Force and Magway People’s Defence Force are among its members. Some may choose to join the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force, although this appears less likely. Likewise, current or prospective SRA members in Magway may seek to engage with Magway’s JMOC collectively through the alliance, rather than joining individually. Whether they choose this route may depend on their immediate security and organisational interests, as well as their longer-term political and ethnic ambitions. At its second conference on 28-30th September 2026, the SRA described itself as both a military bloc and a political coalition. This broader role may influence how its members engage with Magway’s emerging security arrangements.

    Four security scenarios

    The law creates several possible pathways for Magway’s security arrangements. These scenarios are not mutually exclusive and elements of more than one could emerge at the same time. The available data also records forces as formed, but does not confirm that every group remains active in military operations.

    1. Negotiated federal integration

    Magway and the NUG agree on how their respective powers apply to force formation, mobilisation and deployment. PDTs and LPDFs enter the Magway Federal Unit Defence Force or the JMOC through a negotiated process, while PDFs remain under NUG command and coordinate through Regional Command 1. In this scenario, the JMOC becomes a practical link between unit-level forces, Union-level forces and neighbouring groups. Clear command, oversight and supply arrangements help preserve local responsiveness within a wider federal framework.

    1. Uneven dual-track coexistence

    The two pathways operate side by side, but without a comprehensive agreement on their boundaries. Some LPDFs and PDTs join the unit’s Defence Force, others work through the JMOC and some remain under NUG command. Coordination continues where relationships and operational needs support it, but practices vary across groups and districts. Given the different levels of resistance presence across Magway, security governance may develop unevenly: more established in parts of Pakokku and Gangaw and more fluid elsewhere. This appears a plausible near-term scenario while negotiations and force transitions remain incomplete.

    1. NUG-centred continuity with limited unit-level transition

    The NUG retains command of PDFs and some PDTs, while Magway consolidates selected LPDFs into its 13 military columns (or expand more) and builds the unit Defence Force. The JMOC provides a channel for cooperation, but functions mainly as a coordination mechanism rather than as a unified command. This scenario could preserve existing relationships and limit disruption during the transition. However, it would leave the division of authority between the NUG and Magway partly unsettled, particularly over mobilisation, joint operations and accountability.

    1. Fragmented, bloc-based security and confederal drift

    If coordination with the NUG remains weak and the two tracks’ authority is not clarified, forces may develop parallel command and supply arrangements. Groups with close ties to the AA or membership in the SRA could engage with Magway collectively through the JMOC, rather than joining the unit force individually. This may give blocs greater bargaining power, but could also complicate common planning and oversight. Magway would remain able to respond to very localised threats, yet face limits in making or sustaining security commitments that involve Chin, Arakan or the wider national landscape. Over time, autonomous force structures and external security arrangements could push practice towards a confederal model.

    The central issue across these scenarios is whether Magway and the NUG can turn overlapping legal authority into workable coordination. The clearest indicators will be the terms of PDT and LPDF transitions, the JMOC’s actual role in joint operations and whether the two governments establish shared procedures for command, oversight and military supplies.

  • Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway

    Bo Let Yar and Ye Htun Zaw attend the closing ceremony of the first cohort training of the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force. (Photo: Mandalay Free Press)

    This situational analysis is produced under Ah Nyar Studies as part of our broader effort to inform developments in central Burma and advance contextual understanding of the region. The analysis examines post-coup dynamics of natural resource control in Magway, with particular attention to the oil industry’s strategic importance to armed actors. It explores how oil fields have become embedded within evolving conflict structures and shaped authority, revenue generation and local governance.

    In addition to an extensive review of secondary sources, the analysis draws on nine key informant interviews with individuals possessing expert knowledge of the subject matter, including senior CDM staff formerly employed in oil fields in central Burma.

    Introduction

     After the 2021 coup, oil fields (locally known as Yae Nan Hmaw or Yae Nan Myay) have become contested strategic assets, where control over production and revenue is increasingly fragmented among the military regime, the NUG and local resistance groups, with significant implications for governance, security and energy access for people. These groups have been heavily contested across Magway, particularly in resource-rich townships.

    As of 2026, local resistance forces in Magway controlled two of the seven oil fields under the union government’s authority. The two major oil fields located in Pakokku, Myaing, and Pauk townships are currently under the management of the resistance administration. Oil and gas from these fields provided supplies for the Refinery Industry in Chauk township through Kamma and Pakokku.

    What do these oil fields and routes mean to resistance groups in Magway? How do these resources define the fate of the resistance movement and governance?

    Active Oil Fields in Magway

     Myanmar’s crude oil production is sourced from both onshore oil fields and offshore oil and natural gas blocks. There are at least ten onshore oil fields across the country, of which seven are in Magway. Major production comes from Yenangyaung, Chauk, Mann Yae Nan Myay, Pyay Yae Nan Myay, Shwepyitha (Myan-aung), and the Myaing–Pauk areas, according to senior officials who worked in the industry and now joined CDM. Among these, the Yenangyaung, Chauk, and Mann Yae Nan Myay in Magway Region are among the oldest in the country and have historically been among the most productive.

    The Htauk Shar Pin Oil field historically referred to the oil-producing area south of Minbu, beginning from Ta Pin village and extending through the areas around Htauk Shar Pin, Kywe Tho Myaung, Shwe Yaung Taung, and Hpa Lan Yone villages. The Kanni Oil field refers to the oil-producing area around Kanni village at the southern edge of Minbu township, including the surrounding areas of Htein Taw and Pike Pin villages. At present, the Htauk Shar Pin and Kanni oil fields in Minbu township, together with the Htan Kaing and Yae Nan Ma oil fields in Minhla township, are collectively referred to as the Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni Oil fields.

    The Sabe–Thagyitaung oil fields are located along the route from Pakokku through Kyun Chaung toward Seikphyu township, forming part of a broader oil belt that stretches across the country’s centre. According to a local source from Myaing township, this petroleum belt extends from Padauk Kone village in Pale Township, Sagaing Region, southward through areas such as Nyaung Ma, Sin Swei, Wei Taung, and Su Win, before continuing toward Thagyitaung and the Si Kaung area near the Bagan River port (of Irrawaddy River).

    Other major oil fields in Magway include Kyauk Khwet and Hpa Lan Kaine in Myaing and Pauk townships, as well as Wei Taung, Suwin, Nyaung-ma, Htan Kaing, Sabe–Thagyitaung, and parts of the broader Pakokku–Myaing–Pauk oil belt. Local sources describe the area stretching along the ASEAN Road between Myaing and Pauk as one of the main concentrations of hand-dug oil wells and small-scale extraction sites. Some areas, particularly Kyauk Khwet from Myaing township and Hpa Lan Kaine from Pauk township, are also known for their relatively high oil output, with local sources describing some wells as producing large volumes of crude oil.

    Seven Oil Fields in Magway. Two in the yellow zones are under the control of resistance groups.

    Unlike smaller hand-dug wells common in other parts of the central dry zone, some deposits in these mountainous areas reportedly require deeper and more mechanised extraction methods. In recent years, however, extraction methods have gradually become more mechanised with the increased use of machinery and technical equipment.

    Traditional Hand-Dug Well or Let Yet Twin

    Apart from the said major onshore oil fields, there are several tiny oil fields spreading across Magway. These are better known as Let Yet Twin, as locals call them. Traditional hand-dug wells in the region can reach depths of thousands of feet, with workers manually drilling, lowering equipment, and extracting crude oil under difficult conditions. According to Magway government records , there were 45 existing shallow hand-dug oil blocks and 11 newly approved blocks operating in Magway Region in the 2016–2017 fiscal year. This expansion continued into the 2017–2018 cycle as authorities approved 20 license extensions and 12 new permits, generating over 1.5 billion kyats for the regional fund in a single year. These figures represent the last phase of formal stability before the sector became contested; by the 2018–2019 fiscal year, the region’s output from seven major oil fields reached over 2.1 million barrels of crude oil, followed by nearly 3.5 billion cubic feet of natural gas in the 2019–2020 period.

    Resistance Control over Oil and Natural Gas Fields in Magway

    Resistance groups have gained control over oil fields and surrounding communities across Myaing, Pauk and Kamma townships, including two major oil fields previously under the authority of the union government. These are Kyauk Khwet–Let Pan To and Hpa Lan Kaing oil fields in Myaing and Pauk townships and Sabe-Thargyitaung oil field in Pakokku township.

    Earthquake People’s Defence Force fighters in front of a security station of Kyauk-Khwet Oil Field (Photo: Earthquake People’s Defence Force)

    According to U Zaw Min, Minister of Planning and Finance in 2020, these oil fields produced not only crude oil but also natural gas prior to the expansion of resistance control. Official data indicates that the annual natural gas production capacity in FY 2019–2020 reached 3,480 million cubic feet across five major oil fields, including the two now under resistance control. Local sources connected to resistance administrations in Myaing and Pauk confirmed the continued extraction of crude oil, but noted technical limitations regarding natural gas production, stating that:

    “We are only capable of producing crude oil from these two fields, but not natural gas due to technical requirements.”

    Magway regional government data further reported that total regional natural gas production capacity reached 4,554 million cubic feet in FY 2017–2018 and 3,739 million cubic feet in 2018–2019. The gas was distributed across Magway and Mandalay Regions to supply state-owned industrial facilities, including cement and cotton factories. Apart from these two major oil fields, resistance forces also control numerous traditional hand-dug oil wells across Magway, particularly in the areas of Myaing, Pauk, Kamma and Pakokku.

    Refinery Industries

    Magway is a major refinery spot for Myanmar’s petroleum sector. Two of the three major refineries are located in the region. They are;

    • The Petrochemical Complex, locally known as Man Thanbayakan, is located near Minhla Township in Magway Region. The facility was constructed in 1982 by Mitsubishi Heavy Industry with a design refining capacity of 25,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD), and production commenced in 1986. Historically, the complex processed crude oil primarily sourced from the Mann Yae Nan Myay and Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni oil fields. Its products include gasoline, diesel, ATF (aviation turbine fuel), LPG, kerosene, fuel oil (FO) and petroleum coke (pet coke). According to official information, the current operational capacity is approximately 8,500 BPSD (around 300,000 gallons per day), depending on the availability of locally produced crude oil. The facility is also reportedly undergoing upgrading and modernisation works.
    • The (2) Refinery in Chauk Township is one of the oldest refineries in Myanmar. Built in 1954 by the Foster Wheeler Company of England, the refinery consists of an atmospheric distillation tower, a vacuum tower and wax extraction plants, with a design processing capacity of 6,000 barrels per stream day (BPSD). The facility historically processed only locally produced crude oil, primarily sourced from the Chauk and Yenangyaung oil fields, as well as crude oil extracted from the Kyaut Khwet and Lat-pan-to oil fields in Pauk and Myaing townships. Crude oil from the upper part of Magway was transported via pipeline to the Ayadaw Oil field near Tant-Kyi-Taung in Pakokku Township before being sent onward to the refineries in Chauk. In addition to crude oil transportation, natural gas extracted from the Kyaut Khwet field was previously transported by pipeline to Aya-daw and industrial facilities in Wazi to support factory operations. The refinery historically produced gasoline, kerosene, diesel, wax, fuel oil (FO) and blue oil. However, according to official information, the plant was shut down on 5 March 2019 due to the declining availability of local crude oil and natural gas.

    Their combined output accounted for only around 3 per cent of domestic fuel consumption.

    Map Showing Refinery Industries in Magway

    The Recent Deal with the Chinese Corporation for Htauk Shar Pin-Kanni Oil Field

    According to state media reports published on 12 April 2026, the Ministry of Electricity and Energy of the Naypyitaw regime signed an agreement with China-based North Petro-Chem Corporation (Myanmar) to increase crude oil production at the Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni oil field in Min–hla township. The company, with its mother corporation in Xi’an, northern China, is closely associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. The company started Myanmar operations in 2011 with its principal activity for the extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, as stated in Myanmar’s official source. It has been involved in Myanmar’s petroleum sector for more than a decade through exploration and production projects.

    On 10 April 2026, the agreement was reportedly concluded shortly after the formation of the newly formed Naypyitaw regime led by ex-general Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar state media reported that the initiative aims to boost domestic crude oil production in response to Myanmar’s heavy reliance on imported fuel, which accounts for approximately 97% of national consumption, and to help alleviate ongoing fuel shortages. The details of the agreement remain unknown.

    Signing Ceremony for Hautkshabin-Kanni oil field between the Chinese Company and MOGE (Photo: Global New Lights of Myanmar)

    Under the evolving landscape of natural resources politics in Central Burma, four key issues emerge that shape how oil fields are contested, governed, and integrated into the broader conflict economy.

    1) How is the conflict economy structured around oil fields?

    The conflict is increasingly shaped by a fragmented and adaptive political economy rather than fixed territorial control. Since the 2021 coup, oil-producing areas such as Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni and the Myaing–Pauk fields have become contested economic nodes where authority over extraction, transport, and taxation is dispersed among the military, resistance structures, and local actors. While formal ownership often remains with state-linked institutions, actual control on the ground is fluid and continuously negotiated.

    In particular, mature fields like Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni, where most reserves have already been exploited and production is technologically constrained, retain strategic value not because of untapped resources, but because of their integration into wider supply chains and refining systems, including the Mann Thanbayarkan refinery. Within this system, brokers and traders play a critical but less visible role by facilitating the movement of crude oil, refined fuel, and essential goods across conflict lines. These intermediaries operate through highly flexible arrangements, often engaging with multiple armed actors simultaneously and shifting allegiances based on access, security guarantees, and profit margins. As a result, the conflict economy is sustained not only by armed actors but by a network of commercial agents who mediate flows of fuel, taxation, and information.

    2) How are local armed actors competing over oil fields?

    Myaing and Pauk townships have been resistance stronghold areas since 2021. Several local resistance groups exist alongside the NUG’s 3P-forces and LID 101 of Tatmadaw. Some of them are Ah Nyar Myay Alliance (အညာမြေတပ်ပေါင်းစု), Myaing Villages Revolution Front, Earthquake People’s Defence Force  and Myaing Solidarity Alliance (မြိုင်ညီညွတ်ရေးတပ်ပေါင်းစု), Ghost Of Enemies-GOE Revolution and Southern Yesagyo PDF. The competition among armed actors is structured around control of infrastructure rather than the oil wells themselves. Local resistance forces, including the “3Ps” (people’s defence, administration, and security teams), have consolidated influence by embedding themselves within the oil economy—taxing extraction, regulating access to drilling sites, and controlling key transit routes. For instance, these routes are particularly important, as crude and semi-refined oil must pass through checkpoints linking Pauk–Myaing to Pakokku, Monywa, Mandalay, and beyond. Control over these corridors allows actors to extract revenue at multiple points, creating layered taxation systems that can favour one side or another depending on local arrangements.

    At the same time, Tatmadaw continued to rely on fixed checkpoints and garrison-based control, particularly along major transport axes, requiring goods from certain areas to be channelled through junta-controlled routes. However, the system is not purely adversarial. In practice, there are negotiated flows of commodities—such as rice, fuel, and basic goods—where both sides tolerate or facilitate movement that sustains local economies. This produces a form of transactional coexistence, where economic interdependence tempers military confrontation. Nevertheless, the strategic objective for Tatmadaw remains clear: to regain control over oil-producing zones like Pauk in order to cut resistance revenue streams and re-establish centralized control over fuel distribution, through its continuous raids and aerial attacks.

    3) How do external and allied actors fit into this system?

     China’s involvement is primarily anchored in long-term investments and infrastructure, including pipeline corridors and pre-existing production agreements, some of which date back to before 2015 with contract durations spanning 30–50 years. Recent agreements to increase production at fields such as Htauk Shar Pin–Kanni likely suggest continued interest in maintaining output despite the field’s age and technical limitations. The potential reasons could be seen as to

    First, they may have broader strategic and resource interests in the area beyond oil production, including the potential for coal extraction in central Myanmar. For instance, strategic oil and gas pipeline routes pass through areas such as Ngape, Minbu, and Yenangyaung, while coal-related projects and extraction sites have also been linked to areas around Ngape, Padan, and Minbu. According to local sources, several of these projects are owned, operated, or backed by Chinese-linked companies and investors.

    Second, many Chinese companies had already entered Myanmar’s oil and gas sector long before the 2021 coup through long-term exploration and production agreements. Third, as many Western and foreign companies withdrew from Myanmar after the coup, competition in the sector weakened significantly. This created opportunities for Chinese companies to secure market access, expand their influence, negotiate favorable terms, and establish a stronger foothold in Myanmar’s energy sector with fewer competitors.

    Meanwhile, the role of the Arakan Army (AA) appears to operate through logistical and commercial linkages. For instance, fuel produced in Myaing–Pauk is reportedly refined into usable forms and transported toward Chin and Rakhine areas, where it supports both civilian and military needs. Within this system, brokers and trading networks potentially serve as intermediaries connecting Central Burma’s oil economy to AA-aligned supply chains, reflecting a pattern of alliance-based resource sharing. At the same time, constraints on arms purchase and financing among resistance groups may increase reliance on such resource-based networks. As a result, Magway’s oil fields are not isolated assets but form part of a wider, interconnected conflict economy that links production zones in Magway to operational theatres in Chin and Rakhine which reinforces the strategic significance of even declining oil fields.

     4) Tensions in Myaing and Pauk Townships

    Magway Federal Unit is a recently emerged political unit within the Spring Revolution, shaped through the interim constitutional arrangement that recognises the National Unity Government of Myanmar as the union/federal government. The arrangement establishes three branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial. NLD lawmaker Ye Htun Zaw, elected from Constituency No. 2 of Min Hla Township, serves as the Chief Minister of the newly formed government, while youth activist Chit Win Maung serves as his deputy, representing the bloc of unions, women’s organisations, youth organisations and people’s strike committees from the Spring Revolution.

    Magway Federal Unit Government (2026)

    Magway has emerged as a unit within the evolving federal model, with the authority to establish armed forces at the level of a state guard. Article 114 of the constitutional arrangement provides that:

    “The Magway Federal Unit Government shall, in consultation with the National Unity Government of Myanmar, establish the following armed forces for defence and security purposes: (a) the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force; and (b) the Magway Federal Unit Security Force / Police Force.”

    In practice, however, the situation is far more complex than it may appear, given the fragmented landscape of armed resistance groups across Magway, despite their shared objective of resisting the military junta. Within Magway’s political geography, numerous small resistance factions, commonly known as Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDFs), operate independently across villages. Alongside them are the National Unity Government’s People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) and People’s Security Teams (PSTs), more widely known as Pa Ka Pha, active across several townships in Magway. The region is also home to ethnic minority communities and their respective armed organisations.

    These include the Yaw, Taung Thar and Asho Chin ethnic groups. The Yaw and Taung Thar communities are indigenous populations inhabiting the Pon Taung and Pon Nyar hill tracts in north-western Magway. In these hilly areas, the Yaw Army and the Yaw Defence Force are the predominant local armed groups. Both identify themselves as Ethnic Armed Organisations/Revolutionary Organisations (EAOs/EROs) and advocate for self-determination in the region. At the same time, major battalions and PSTs (Pa Ka Pha) under the Ministry of Defence of the NUG are active across the three townships of Gangaw, Tilin and Saw.

    The Asho Chin (also known as Plains Chin) are a small ethnic subgroup of the broader Chin ethnic population inhabiting lowland areas of Myanmar, particularly in western Magway. Following the military coup, two major armed groups emerged within the community: the Asho Chin Defence Force (ACDF) and the Chin Defence Force–Asho (CDF-Asho). Both maintain connections with resistance forces operating in the hilly areas of Ngape and Sidoktaya townships along the Magway–Rakhine border. Both groups advocate for ethnic liberation and self-determination.

    These local armed groups have been substantially integrated into the political processes of drafting of the Magway interim constitutional arrangement and formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government. They constitute two of the seven representative blocs shaping the political process and institutional development of the Magway Federal Unit.

    Beyond these two ethnic armed branches, several other LPDFs continue to operate alongside the NUG’s PDFs and PSTs. These include groups such as the People’s Revolution Alliance (Magway), the Southern Yesagyo PDF and the United States of Burma Army-USBA. While some maintain affiliations with the NUG, others operate independently outside the formal NUG command structure.

    Within this fragmented security landscape, security governance in Magway remains inherently challenging, beyond the influence of the NUG alone. The petroleum sites in the resistance strongholds of Myaing and Pauk Townships have constituted particularly intense contestation among the various security actors operating in Magway. More recently, following the formation of the Magway Federal Unit Government and its attempt to establish a Unit Guard Force, Chief Minister Ye Htun Zaw and Security Minister Let Yar attended the closing ceremony of the first cohort of Guard Force training. The event subsequently sparked existing complexities and tensions within the regional dynamics between LPDFs, the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit.

    Bo Let Yar and Ye Htun Zaw attend the closing ceremony of the first cohort training of the Magway Federal Unit Guard Force. (Photo: Mandalay Free Press)

    The NUG reportedly mobilised hundreds of PDF personnel to the area amid claims that the operation aimed to capture Bo Let Yar. However, Soe Thura Zaw, a senior official from the Ministry of Defence, denied the accusation, stating that the situation was not a dispute between the Magway Federal Unit and the NUG. He further rejected claims that the operation concerned control over petroleum sites. According to him, the operation had two primary objectives: (1) to undertake corrective and chain of command measures in response to issues relating to the Myaing PST, following unsuccessful attempts to impose administrative action in 2024 and 2025; and (2) to deploy forces for security duties to protect petroleum sites placed under union/federal management. In response to Soe Thura Zaw’s statement, Chief Minister Ye Htun Zaw wrote on his Facebook that the conflict was associated with resource governance. He further stated that senior NUG officials needed to adhere to the decisions jointly agreed upon between the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit on 5 April 2026 regarding the management of petroleum and related products. Coinciding with the timing of the incident, 21 local PDFs operating in the area and across Magway issued a statement on 18 April 2026 declaring that the groups would affiliate with the Magway Federal Unit under its military command structure.

    Adding to this contestation, Tatmadaw’s LID 101, based in Pakokku and backed by Meiktila-based LID 99, launched a large-scale mobilisation of troops along the main roads connecting Pakokku to Pauk, Myaing and Yesagyo. This triggered the most recent escalation of conflict from late April through to the time of writing of this briefing paper. Thousands of villagers from the three townships have reportedly fled to farmlands and neighbouring villages. More recently, junta forces raided and burned houses in several villages in Yesagyo Township.

    The recently adopted constitutional arrangement of the Magway Federal Unit establishes a policy framework for the sharing of revenues and financial interests between the NUG and the Unit (Section 129), while the Unit retains legislative authority over natural resources (Section 169(d)).

    Conclusion

    Three major contested zones can be observed within Magway’s resistance landscape:

    • The eastern bank of the Ayeyarwady River, particularly the Salay-Chauk-Gwaycho plain;
    • The upland areas on the western bank of the Ayeyarwady River, particularly Minhla, Ngape, Sidoktaya, Mindon and Thayet townships;
    • The Bhan-Kywe and Pa-Khan plains (In Burmese: ဗန့်ကျီ-ပခန်းလွင်ပြင်) (Yesagyo, Myaing, Pale and Yinmarbin townships) and the Pon Taung-Pon Nyar Hills.

    Key Takeaways

    • Security and political contestation are likely to intensify further in resource-concentrated zones and key transportation corridors. These dynamics will involve not only confrontation between the Tatmadaw and resistance forces but also growing competition between the Magway Federal Unit and the NUG.
    • The petroleum agreement between the Chinese company and the Naypyitaw regime represents a development that warrants close attention. It may be understood as more than merely technical assistance from China for petroleum production, carrying potentially significant implications for regional security and political dynamics.
    • The ways the NUG and the Magway Federal Unit manage disputes concerning the administration of petroleum fields in the Myaing-Pauk area will test the integrity of the Magway Federal Unit’s political arrangement. At the same time, the case presents an important point of reference for other emerging federal units and states in Burma.
    • The influence exercised by Arakan and Chin revolutionary organisations, operating within broader alliance frameworks, over Magway’s petroleum fields and strategic transportation routes has become a significant factor shaping the region’s security and political developments. In particular, the security and political positioning of revolutionary forces operating in the Pon Taung-Pon Nyar Hills and the Arakan Yoma hill tracts – areas aligned with the Arakan Army – are becoming critical determinants in Magway’s evolving conflict and political landscape.

    Cite this article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026, May 15). Petro-Contestation and Emerging Governance Orders in Magway [Situational Brief]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies.


     

  • An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (Part 3)

    This analysis is Part (III) of the Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma. While Part I examined the structural formation of federal units and Part II analysed their internal power structures, this section focuses on the human rights frameworks embedded within the interim constitutional arrangements of three federal units in Ah Nyar. In the context of ongoing armed conflict and evolving governance arrangements, these interim constitutional frameworks represent early attempts to articulate commitments to fundamental rights, freedoms, and protections for people from war zones. This section, therefore, examines the scope of rights recognised in these interim constitutions and assesses the institutional mechanisms provided for their protection.

    Before examining the human rights frameworks, it is important to understand the nature of the interim political arrangements adopted by the three federal units in Ah Nyar. These arrangements are neither purely legal nor purely political; rather, they represent a hybrid arrangement that combines legal foundations with the practical necessities of interim governance amid the revolutionary context in central Burma. The terminology used in these documents itself reflects different approaches to the legality and political nature of the arrangements. Sagaing refers to its document as a “constitution”, Magway adopts the term “arrangement law”, while Mandalay uses “interim arrangement.” These distinctions are not merely semantic. They reflect attempts to balance legal legitimacy with the need for flexibility in governance under conditions of conflict and political transition. Moreover, the authority and process through which these documents were adopted have also influenced the terminology used in each case. Nevertheless, these interim political arrangements function as the supreme legal frameworks during the interim period (Art. 18 of the Magway Interim Arrangement Law, Art.11 of the Mandalay Interim Arrangement, and Art. 2 of the Sagaing Interim Constitution).

    Human Rights Responsibilities of the State

    Over decades of civil war, Burma has long experienced different forms of sub-national governance and political arrangements, particularly among ethnic liberation movements such as the Karen, Wa, and Kachin. They are driven by liberation and self-determination. These structures have largely been shaped by wartime necessity. What is different in the emerging federal units in central Burma is the deliberate division of power across the three branches of government – legislative, executive and judicial. The state constitutions set out clear boundaries between these branches (Art. 7 of Mandalay Interim Arrangement, Art. 12 of Magway Interim Arrangement and Arti 6 of Sagaing constitution). These institutions are expected to exercise checks and balances. On human rights, these interim constitutional arrangements provide legal foundations to guarantee fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.

    International human rights law establishes that the primary responsibility for protecting and promoting human rights lies with the state. The UDHR affirms that individuals are entitled to effective remedies for violations of their rights (Art. 8) and to the realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights necessary for human dignity (Art. 22). These principles are further codified in the two major international covenants (ICCPR and ICESCR). Together, these instruments require states to respect, protect and fulfil human rights by establishing legal frameworks to ensure human rights responsibilities of the state, including taking appropriate measures to realise social, economic and cultural rights progressively.

    Burma is not a State Party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, it is a State Party to several other core international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In the absence of a federal constitutional framework, sub-national constitutions re-affirm commitments to state responsibilities under international law (Art. 177 of the Magway Interim Arrangement Law; Art. 191 of the Sagaing Interim Constitution; with no corresponding provision in the Mandalay Interim Arrangement).

    Fundamental Rights and Freedom

    The three constitutional frameworks demonstrate a clear commitment to the protection of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In doing so, they broadly reflect core international human rights standards, particularly in relation to civil and political rights, across all three federal units. While these provisions are articulated within interim constitutional arrangements, they indicate a deliberate effort to align with established human rights norms.

    At the core, a set of fundamental rights and freedoms is consistently recognised across all three frameworks. These include:

    1. Right to Life
    2. Right to legal recognition as a person, and the right to acquire respect and protection for her/his human dignity
    3. Right to equality before the law.
    4. Right to freely express, write, publish, and have access to and disseminate information.
    5. Right to freedom of thought, belief, religion and the freedom to observe and practice customs and traditions.
    6. Right to freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.
    7. Right to freely form and participate in associations.
    8. Right to trade and work
    9. No one shall be subjected to forced labour, torture, enslavement, sexual abuse, and degrading treatment.

    Civil and Political Rights

    The civil and political rights provisions across the three constitutional frameworks show a partial but meaningful alignment with the standards set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Core protections are broadly recognised across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. These include the right to life, protection from torture and forced labour, liberty and security of the person, equality before the law, and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, religion and association. Other core civil and political rights are also widely listed in all three constitutional frameworks across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay. These include

    1. Equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of civil and political rights
    2. Fair trial rights
    3. Right to recognition (as a person) before the law
    4. Right to be free from arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family, home or correspondence, and from unlawful attacks on one’s honour and reputation.
    5. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion
    6. Right to hold opinions without interference
    7. Right to marriage
    8. Minority rights (to enjoy their culture, religion, etc.)

    At the same time, the comparison highlights notable gaps and inconsistencies when assessed against international human rights law. Certain foundational rights under the ICCPR, such as the right to an effective remedy and the prohibition of propaganda for war, are absent across all three frameworks. Other core rights, including the right to self-determination, freedom of movement, political participation, and child protection, are unevenly recognised, appearing in some constitutions but not others. In Sagaing, the right to self-determination, particularly for ethnic minorities, is generally recognised under Articles 153 and 47 of the constitution. However, this right is not explicitly provided for in Mandalay and Magway.

    Meanwhile, certain rights are not constitutionally entrenched but are instead left to be addressed through specific legislation to be enacted by the interim parliaments, including the Child Rights Law in the Magway Federal Unit. Rights to participate in public affairs, to vote, and to be elected are not constitutionalised in Sagaing and Mandalay, but are recognised in Magway under Article 25 of the Interim Arrangement Law.

    Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

    The economic, social and cultural rights across the three constitutional frameworks show an uneven and selective level of development when compared to civil and political rights. While all three recognise certain core labour-related rights such as the right to work, just and favourable conditions of work and the right to form trade unions, this reflects only a partial alignment with the standards set out in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The principle of equal rights of men and women in the enjoyment of these rights is also consistently recognised.

    However, other key ESCR protections remain limited. The right to social security is only provided in Sagaing, while absent in both Magway and Mandalay. Similarly, the right to education is fully recognised in Sagaing but only partially addressed in Mandalay and not explicitly provided in Magway. Broader rights, such as the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to mental health, are largely absent across all three frameworks.

    At the same time, each framework goes beyond the ICESCR in its own way. This is not incidental. It reflects the lived realities and priorities of each federal unit in central Burma. In Sagaing, for example, the constitution brings in environmental rights, guarantees healthcare access without discrimination, and recognises protections for youth, women, and persons with disabilities. These are not abstract commitments. They respond directly to conditions on the ground. Taken together, they point to an emerging effort to shape a broader, more responsive social policy framework, even within the limits of interim governance. Mandalay, meanwhile, includes provisions on primary healthcare, targeted healthcare for vulnerable groups, farmers’ rights, and cultural promotion.

    Sub-national protection mechanisms

    The sub-national protection mechanisms for human rights across three federal units remain varied. They are still evolving. A key question is whether protection is institutionalised through an independent mechanism or embedded within existing governance structures. The central issue, however, is whether a coherent human rights protection system is taking shape across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay under the current constitutional frameworks. That said, what have we seen now?

    All three federal units provide for a “free and fair judiciary system” (Art. 6 in Sagaing, Art. 7 in Mandalay and Art. 12 (a and b) in Magway). This matters. It places the judiciary at the centre of rights protection. At the same time, interim parliaments and governments are mandated to establish independent commissions, including for human rights protection (Art. 61 in Sagaing, Art. 46 in Mandalay, and 72(l) in Magway). These are still openings rather than fully operational institutions. But they point to a direction where more structured protection mechanisms could emerge as they create space.

    Sagaing goes further in setting out constitutional protection. Article 42 (a) provides

    “The right to apply to the Office of the Supreme Court of Sagaing Federal Unit when seeking constitutional protection”.

    This right is non-derogable (Art. 42 (b)). In addition, Article 41 (a) states “The right to receive legal protection by filing a complaint to the Unit’s Human Rights Commission in cases of human rights violations.”

    More broadly, there is also a baseline expectation that the state provides protection. Article 24 of the Sagaing Constitution states that “Every citizen residing in Sagaing Federal Unit has a right to receive protection from the Sagaing Federal Unit Government in accordance with the law.” A similar provision appears in Article 51 of the Magway Constitution. Taken together, these provisions indicate that responsibility for protection is recognised. But how this responsibility is exercised and coordinated across institutions remains an open question.

    At the same time, it should be noted that discussions on the Division of Competencies (DoC) are still ongoing. It is not yet clear how these federal units will cooperate with the Human Rights Commission or the Ministry of Human Rights of the National Unity Government. As these arrangements continue to take shape, a key question remains: will these emerging mechanisms evolve into a coherent system of protection, or remain fragmented across different levels of governance?

    Conclusion

    These constitutions are not only framed as rights-based documents; they also reflect this in their structure and emphasis. A significant portion of their content is dedicated to human rights and protection—23 per cent in Sagaing, 22 per cent in Magway, and 18 per cent in Mandalay. While the differences are not substantial, they suggest a relatively consistent prioritisation of rights across the three frameworks, with Sagaing showing a slightly stronger emphasis. They set out a foundation of fundamental rights and freedoms that, in many ways, function as an emerging Bill of Rights across the federal units. Some specific rights are also set to be defined through separate legislation, such as the Farmers’ Rights Law in Sagaing and the Minority and Child Rights Laws in Magway. There is also a clear effort to draw from and respect international human rights law. This matters. It shows that these frameworks are not being built in isolation. That said, this is a meaningful starting point. The foundations are there.

    Cite this article: Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. (2026, April 11). An Emerging Bill of Rights? Human Rights in Ah Nyar’s Federal Units [Briefing paper]. Centre for Ah Nyar Studies. https://ah-nyarstudies.org/an-emerging-bill-of-rights-human-rights-in-ah-nyars-federal-units/

  • Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Analysis of the Evolving Power Structure of Federal Units in Central Burma

    Photo: People of Sagaing Show Their Support for Operation 1027 and Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (Photo: Sagaing Region Strike Forces’ Facebook Page)

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 2)

    The emergence of federal units in central Burma marks a major shift in the country’s revolutionary politics, shaped by the political dynamics of the Spring Revolution. Although this development has been influenced to some extent by the federal principles articulated by actors involved in the NCA process before the coup, as well as by the longstanding principles of ethnic revolutionary groups, the formation of federal units has been driven primarily by the latest discussions after the coup. In the meantime, central Burma has become a testing ground for revolutionary governance, shaped by various armed and political actors working towards a common goal.

    While Part (1) of this series traced the origins and formation of these federal units, Part II examines the power structures within the three units. The analysis aims to uncover how central authority is organised, distributed, and contested, and to offer insights into the political struggles at the regional (federal unit) level amid growing calls for NUG reform.

    Constituent Base of Power

    The power structure of the federal units is shaped by three overlapping sources of legitimacy: electoral, revolutionary, and civil. These cores altogether create a hybrid political order that is neither traditionally parliamentary nor purely revolutionary. This hybrid nature is still a new concept in the political history of Burma.

    Sources of Legitimacy

    Electoral legitimacy derives from the 2020 elected MPs who constitute the unit parliaments. The 2020 General Elections were an electoral process established under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution. Under that Constitution, the terms of the parliaments were set at five years (see Sections 119, 151 and 168[1]). However, the Constitution was completely abolished by the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw on 31 March 2021[2]. Since then, the new terms of the unit parliaments have been defined as lasting until the emergence of new parliaments under a permanent constitution developed for each region (see Section 58 of the Magway Interim Arrangements; Section 65 of the Mandalay Interim Arrangements; and Section 51 of the Sagaing Constitution).

    Unit parliaments have very limited capacity to exercise territorial authority due to displacement, weak administrative structures, and the complex dynamics of post-coup actors. Nevertheless, their presence provides continuity with pre-coup democratic mandates and offers both local and international legitimacy. The unit parliaments also confer legality on the interim arrangements and serve as the principal bodies for legislative oversight during wartime.

    Revolutionary legitimacy arises from resistance groups that have gained authority through territorial control or influence within the units. These groups include the “3-Ps” (People’s Defence Team, People’s Administration Team, and People’s Security Team) of NUG and the Local People’s Defence Forces (LPDF). Their legitimacy is grounded in the practical authority they exercise through on-the-ground governance and the provision of security. A closer look at the leadership and the composition of resistance groups, four broad community clusters can be identified: youth groups, political parties (primarily the NLD), students’ unions, and local labour and peasant communities. Youth groups involved in national and regional youth policy processes between 2015 and 2020 now form the core of youth-led resistance groups in the region, while the NLD youth wings in the three regions (now federal units) and other democratic political parties have also joined the armed resistance. In central Burma, the Myay-Latt and upper Burma divisions of the All Burma Federation of Students’ Unions, along with several university students’ unions, joined various armed organisations after the coup. In addition, local labour and peasant communities also stepped forward to take up arms and fight against the military junta following the coup.

    Despite differing levels of participation in the political process surrounding the interim arrangements, no direct involvement of resistance groups was found in Sagaing, whereas such involvement was evident in Magway and Mandalay (as reflected in categories 6 and 4 of their respective drafting bodies). In Magway, 14% of the members of the drafting commission were representatives of armed resistance groups, compared with 9% in Mandalay.

    Civic–stakeholder legitimacy comes from women’s organisations, labour groups, peasants, ethnic/minority groups, students’ unions, strike groups, youth networks, and CDM civil servants. Although this category represents very diverse organs, three major groups significantly influence this layer: ethnic minorities, CDM participants, and strike groups. These three groups have demonstrated a relatively higher level of dominance over the political process, beginning with the drafting phase and continuing to the current stage of executive formation. Local bodies representing each group have emerged alongside the drafting process. These include the Sagaing Region Strike Forces[3], formed by strike groups in the Sagaing Region; the Sagaing Federal Unit CDM Civil Servants Council[4] and the Chin Ethnic Groups[5] of the Magway Federal Unit.

    Yinmarbin-Salingyi Strike of Sagaing Region Strike Forces [6]

    This inclusion reflects the social character of the Spring Revolution and broadens political participation beyond armed actors and elected officials. However, their roles often lack a clear constituency and accountability mechanisms, leading to overlapping mandates and the potential duplication of functions.

    These sources of legitimacy combine and create a power structure characterised by negotiation, decentralisation, and collective decision-making. Clearly, the term “consensus” is frequently described in the interim arrangements (in Sagaing, it is the constitution) of three units.

    Varied Models of Executive Power

    The three units share common goals and similar political origins, but they adopt different models of executive power to adapt to the need to balance local power and drive the resistance movement forward.

    Sagaing adopts a highly collectivised executive structure. The five groups responsible for drafting the Sagaing Constitution have significant influence over executive authority, as Section 67 empowers them to scrutinise and select members of the executive. Their influence is further reinforced by Section 66, which permits only individuals belonging to the representative groups involved in the constitution-drafting commission to serve as cabinet members. The Chief Minister has very limited unilateral power, and the government operates through consensus among representative blocs. The Chief Minister does not have the executive authority to appoint or remove any cabinet members, including the Chief Administrator of the Naga Self-Administered Zone. Nor does the Chief Minister have the power to restructure the executive body under the constitution.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Sagaing

    This model strictly prevents the concentration of power in any single actor but risks policy paralysis under collective leadership.

    Magway presents the most codified and legally formalised model of executive formation among the federal units. Law No. 1/2023 of the Federal Unit Parliament institutionalises the drafting commission as a body composed of seven representative blocs, and these blocs subsequently become embedded as core political actors within the executive architecture. Their influence is structurally established through Sections 12(d), 61–63, and 152–154 of the Magway Interim Arrangement.

    Process Diagram of Cabinet Formation in Magway

    Section 12(d) predetermines the composition of the cabinet by limiting eligibility to members of these seven blocs, effectively transforming the drafting commission into a gatekeeping mechanism for executive authority. Sections 61–63 further empower the blocs to constitute the Selection Commission responsible for appointing cabinet members, including the Chief Minister. Each bloc nominates one candidate for Chief Minister, and the Selection Commission—comprised of representatives from these same blocs under Sections 153 and 154 determines the executive leadership. Although the Chief Minister is nominally authorised to nominate ministers, cabinet formation remains contingent on the collective consent of the seven blocs and subsequent parliamentary approval. In effect, the Magway model reflects the Sagaing protocol: the Chief Minister lacks unilateral authority to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet. Executive authority is instead dispersed across the seven blocs and the parliament. Consequently, Magway’s executive structure operates as a hybrid parliamentary model in which executive leadership is balanced, and at times constrained, by institutionalised checks from both parliamentary institutions and civil–political groups.

    Mandalay adopts the least formalised and most centralised model, built around the Coordination Platform of revolutionary forces (the Mandalay Platform). Its Interim Governing Council is selected by the 11–15 representative blocs from the Mandalay Platform, followed by parliamentary approval. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, the Mandalay Executive Head is authorised to appoint, dismiss, or restructure the cabinet.

    Process Diagram of Council Formation in Mandalay

    However, there are no provisions in the arrangement guiding the accountability mechanisms of executive members. It remains unclear whether executive members will be held accountable to the parliament or to the Mandalay Platform. Mandalay has not yet published the members of the Mandalay Platform. The absence of detailed legal provisions on accountability reflects the politically sensitive security environment, where coordination takes precedence over legal precision.

    Reference

    [1] Section 119. The term of the Pyithu Hluttaw is five years from the day of its first session. Section 151. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Amyotha Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw. Section 168. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw is the same as the term of the Pyithu Hluttaw. The term of the Region or State Hluttaw expires on the day of the expiry of the Pyithu Hluttaw.

    [2] CRPH, “Declaration on the Complete Abolition of the 2008 Constitution” [31 March 2021]. Available here: https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statements/crph3103212/

    [3] https://www.facebook.com/Sggstrike

    [4] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100091451325717

    [5] https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=61580838481806

    [6] https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=122196780116063633&set=pb.61551909016018.-2207520000&type=3

    Read part (1) of the briefing paper here.


  • Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma (part 1)

    Understanding Federal Units in Central Burma

    Briefing Paper on Federal Unit Politics of Central Burma (part 1)

    Introduction

     

    The dry zone or Central Burma is locally known as Ah Nyar (or Anyar). The central plain where Burmese majority lives was once politically referred to as the heartland of the Myanmar military (or Tatmadaw). It could be due to some demographic and geographic strategy of the Tatmadaw. Firstly, Tatmadaw is the state military, and it is formed by the Burmese majority, and the founding father General Aung San is from Natmauk of Ah Nyar. On the second, and more importantly, the tactical formation of Tatmadaw was strategically built on fighting against its domestic enemies in the periphery states. Tatmadaw has been a central figure of the decade-long civil war with ethnic liberation movement, particularly Karen, Mon of southern Burma, Kachin of northern Burma, Shan of Eastern Burma and Rakhine and Chin of western Burma. In light of this peripheral warfare in the mountainous regions, its major supply bases were heavily located in the central plain areas of Ah Nyar, mostly in Magway region. Out of 25 Weapon Manufacturing Industries of Directorate of Defence Industries of Tatmadaw, 68% of industries manufacturing major weapon supplies are situated in Ah Nyar alone, while the remaining 32% are in Bago and Yangon. Additionally, its human resource pool has long been filled by unemployed young men from central Burma. It was not an unfounded hypothesis for the Tatmadaw’s military strategists to view Ah Nyar as a strategic and secure position from which to counter and contain its enemies in the peripheral states. Who would have imagined the rise of a revolutionary movement in Ah Nyar? Neither the Tatmadaw nor its opposition groups, including Burma’s ethnic revolutionary organisations, could have foreseen it.

     

    The 2021 military coup d’état became a miracle in the history of revolution in Burma. The people of Ah Nyar became a central figure of the prominent Spring Revolution in Burma since the early days of 2021. Despite the tragedies on the frontlines and the fragmented structure of the resistance groups, their guerrilla campaigns have, at times, demonstrated efforts to evolve into conventional warfare, most notably marked by the launch of Operation 1027. This has also led to re-framing revolutionary strategies in Ah Nyar.

     

    Nearly five years into the Spring Revolution, with Ah Nyar at its heart, the movement now confronts escalating threats from the Tatmadaw. This raises a critical question: what direction is the revolution in Ah Nyar now taking?

     

    Contextual origins

     

    Across central Burma, the emergence of federal units was not from the prior constitutional design but a response to the evolving dynamics of the Spring Revolution. As resistance forces gained territorial control across Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay alongside advances in northern Shan, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine, the need for structured governance became increasingly urgent. Beginning in early 2023, consultations among local revolutionary actors, 2020 elected representatives and community networks led to the creation of drafting bodies for interim arrangements. These interim frameworks opened political space for decentralised regional federal governments that complement, coordinate with and strengthen the broader federal-democratic movement led by the National Unity Government.

     

    The three regions of central Burma are currently in the process of establishing federal units; most notably Sagaing, which many diplomats and scholars see pioneer of federal units. All three regions of central Burma have now enacted legal arrangements for forming federal unit governments. These interim arrangements form the core of the regional political framework and are key to understanding the direction in which the revolution in Ah Nyar is heading, despite the presence of several tiny factions of resistance groups in each region.

     

    Drafting and Approval Framework

     

    The drafting processes were led by the drafting bodies established by the respective regional parliaments. In Magway and Sagaing, the interim arrangements drafting processes began following the enactment of Laws No. 1/2023 in both regions, dated 17 November 2023. In contrast to these two regions, the Mandalay interim arrangements drafting process commenced through an agreement between the Mandalay parliament (Committee Representing Mandalay Hluttaw) and revolutionary groups in Mandalay. Unlike Sagaing and Magway, Mandalay deliberately avoided using the term “law”; instead, it adopted the “Plan for Coordination and Drafting of Interim Political Arrangements in Mandalay”. The plan was officially approved on 12 July 2024. Nevertheless, the principles and drafting processes across all three regions are largely similar.

     

    Drafting Bodies

    Approval Process

    Unit parliaments hold the sole authority to approve the interim arrangements in Sagaing and Magway. Mandalay follows a two-step approval process: first, the interim arrangements must be approved by the Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform, which comprises seven groups representing revolutionary forces; and second, the Mandalay Parliament (in Burmese, မန္တလေးဒေသလွှတ်တော်) approves and announces the arrangements to the public.

    Executive

    Despite differences in terminology, the structure and functions of unit governments in central Burma are largely similar.

    Structure

    Who Forms the Cabinet?

    Sagaing

    Constituting the Sagaing Cabinet is based on selection, as defined in Chapter 5 of the constitution, rather than appointment. Section 67 requires the parliament (Sagaing Federal Unit Hluttaw) to form a Scrutiny and Selection Commission (SSC) for the Interim Sagaing Federal Unit Government. By structure, the SSC comprises representatives similar to those in the drafting commission (for the interim arrangement), together with representatives from the People’s Administration Team in Sagaing. The SSC plays a crucial role in selecting candidates for the position of Chief Minister, and the parliament elects the Chief Minister through a secret ballot system.

    Once the Chief Minister is confirmed and formally appointed by the parliament, the Chief Minister joins the SSC to select and nominate the remaining members of the cabinet for parliamentary approval.

    Magway

    The Magway Interim Cabinet is constituted through a selection-based system, rather than an appointment system. Under Section 61 of the interim arrangement, the Selection Commission is required to nominate candidates for the position of Chief Minister for approval by the parliament. Once the parliament confirms the Chief Minister, the CM, upon the agreement of the seven parties represented in the Interim Drafting Commission, may nominate the remaining members of the cabinet. These nominations must then be submitted to the parliament for final approval.

    Mandalay

    The Mandalay Region People’s Revolutionary Forces Coordination Platform serves as the key body responsible for forming the Selection Commission for members of the Mandalay Interim Governing Council (MIGC), in accordance with Section 67 of the interim arrangement. The Mandalay parliament is then required to approve the Commission’s selections and formally announce the formation of the MIGC.

    Political Leadership

    Defence and Security

    Sagaing

    Sagaing Federal Unit establishes a federalised, civilian-led, and NUG-coordinated security architecture. The constitution allows Sagaing to form two types of armed forces — the People’s Security Team and the People’s Defence Team (the “2-Ps”), excluding the People’s Defence Force. Although NUG may deploy the 2-Ps with the agreement of the Unit Government, these forces remain under the authority and control of the Unit Government. In accordance with Section 142, the Unit Government is required to establish a Defence and Security Council to oversee the security governance of the Unit.

    Magway

    Magway interim arrangement sets out a civilian-led, locally grounded, and revolutionary-aligned security architecture. Section 114 establishes that security and defence functions fall under the authority of the Magway Interim Government. To support this, the Magway Federal Unit Parliament is mandated to enact laws governing the Unit’s security and defence forces (Section 123). An additional provision is also included that the Unit’s Ministry of Defence must form a preparatory committee to organise the Unit’s security and defence force in coordination with the armed revolutionary actors operating within the region.

    Mandalay

    The interim arrangement does not contain any provisions on this matter.

    Terms of Government

    Photos: Internet


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